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RECONCILING CHEVRON, MEAD, AND THE REVIEW OF
AGENCY DISCRETION: SOURCE OF LAW AND THE
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Michael P. Healy*
INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court's watershed decision in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.' has been understood by
many as defining the framework for judicial review of agency legal deter-
minations,2 there have been longstanding questions about the application of
the standards for reviewing administrative action.' These questions have
become more troublesome following the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in
United States v. Mead Corp.4 Mead established that Chevron review only
applies when defined requirements are met and held that so-called Skid-
Willburt D. Ham Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. J.D., 1984, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania; B.A., 1978, Williams College. The author thanks Kent Barnett, Mark
Kightlinger, and the Honorable John Rogers for reviewing an earlier draft of the Article. The author is
responsible for any errors.
I 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2 See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 399 (5th
ed. 2009) ("The Court has applied the Chevron two-step in over one hundred cases decided since 1984,
and circuit courts have applied it in thousands of cases."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 10.35, at 703 (3d ed. 1991) ("[T]he Chevron doctrine applies to review of all statutory interpretation
by agencies-whether in rules or adjudicatory decisions."); Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons
in the Review ofAdministrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (describing Chevron as "the
formative case governing the allocation of interpretive authority in the administrative state"); E. Donald
Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and
Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2005) ("Chevron signified a fundamental
paradigm-shift that redefined the roles of courts and agencies when construing statutes over which
agencies have been given interpretive rights." (footnote omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero,
92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006) ("[Chevron] has become foundational, even a quasi-constitutional
text-the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of authority between federal
courts and administrative agencies."). See generally PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 1032-33 (rev. 10th ed. 2003) (providing "[s]oundbites
on Chevron's importance").
3 See generally Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997) (providing a critique of court of appeals decisions under step two of Che-
vron). More recently, prominent scholars have debated whether Chevron is better understood as involv-
ing one or two steps of analysis. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron s
Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009); Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only
One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
4 533U.S.218(2001).
1
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more' deference applies when Chevron deference does not apply.6 Survey-
ing the aftermath of Mead and its effect on the lower courts, one scholar has
written that "Mead has muddled judicial review of agency action,"' and
Justice Antonin Scalia has recently lamented the Mead decision's "ongoing
obfuscation of this once-clear area of administrative law."' Another promi-
nent scholar has opined that "a threshold question-the scope of judicial
review-has become one of the most vexing in regulatory cases."'
This Article seeks to reconcile the principles that have animated judi-
cial review of agency legal determinations, including agency exercises of
discretion, since before the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").o The reconciliation accounts for the relevant review standards
defined in APA Section 706."
5 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). When a court employs Skidmore deference,
it follows the agency interpretation only to the extent the court is persuaded by the agency's interpreta-
tion. See infra Part lB.
6 See infra Part 1.F for a discussion of the Court's decision in Mead.
7 Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND.
L. REv. 1443, 1475 (2005) ("As Justice Scalia predicted, Mead has muddled judicial review of agency
action. Lower courts apply different analytical frameworks to determine when Congress delegates, and
agencies exercise, authority to issue interpretations with the force of law. Furthermore, courts avoid
Mead and Chevron when Skidmore will do. Finally, they disregard Mead's basic purpose and invert the
case."); see also id. at 144344 ("When the Supreme Court decided [Mead] four years ago, Justice
Scalia predicted that judicial review of agency action would devolve into chaos. This Article puts that
prediction to the test by examining the court of appeals decisions applying the decision. Justice Scalia
actually understated the effect of Mead." (footnote omitted)); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic
Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 560-61 (2006) (noting that "[t]he precise meaning of Mead,
both in general and with respect to the significance of procedural formality, is difficult to discern" and
that "the immediate impact of the decision appears to have been widespread confusion in the courts of
appeals, and the Justices themselves continue to squabble over what the opinion actually held" (footnote
omitted)).
8 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.5 (2011) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("I have chosen to interpret the Court as referring to Skidmore deference, rather than
Chevron deference or something in-between, in order to minimize the Court's ongoing obfuscation of
this once-clear area of administrative law."); see also Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation
Council, 129 S. Ct. 24,38, 2479 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("It is quite impossible to achieve
predictable (and relatively litigation-free) administration of the vast body of complex laws committed to
the charge of executive agencies without the assurance that reviewing courts will accept reasonable and
authoritative agency interpretation of ambiguous provisions. If we must not call that practice Chevron
deference, then we have to rechristen the rose. Of course the only reason a new name is required is our
misguided opinion in Mead, whose incomprehensible criteria for Chevron deference have produced so
much confusion in the lower courts. . . .").
9 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 190 (commenting that recent administrative law decisions are "pro-
ducing not only a decrease in agency authority, but also a significant increase in uncertainty about the
appropriate approach. More than at any time in recent years, a threshold question-the scope of judicial
review-has become one of the most vexing in regulatory cases").
10 The provision defining the standards of judicial review, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006), provides as
follows:
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Critical to the reconciliation and to the coherence of the standards of
review, is the determination of whether the agency or Congress has pro-
vided the source of the law being applied and reviewed in the case. 2 When
Congress has not clearly defined the law, the interpretive role of the court
depends on whether the agency itself has made law. If the agency has made
law, the court should determine only whether the agency's decisionmaking
process was reasonable when the agency defined the substantively permiss-
ible law. If the agency has not made law, then the court must itself deter-
mine the meaning of the ambiguous statute. In that latter case, the court will
substitute its substantive interpretation for the agency's interpretation in the
event that they differ. This analytic approach resolves several uncertainties
that characterize standards of review following Mead's gloss on Chevron.
First, it clearly defines the interpretive impact of the court's decision that
the Chevron regime either does or does not apply. Second, it identifies the
proper place to pursue the Mead analysis. Third, it permits an understand-
ing of the proper nature of Skidmore review. Finally, it allows for an under-
standing of the role of reviewing agency discretion under both the Chevron
and Skidmore frameworks.
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the
reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those
parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
Id. The APA was enacted in 1946. See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2006)).
11 See supra note 10.
12 This focus on the source of law is closely related to Professor Strauss's discussion of the differ-
ent roles played by courts in their review of agency legal determinations. He writes that:
A common problem is that, for some issues, courts are entitled to be the deciders-perhaps
influenced by agency view but nonetheless themselves independently responsible for the
conclusions reached. For other issues, the conclusion that Congress has validly delegated au-
thority to the agency carries with it the corollary that the agency is responsible for decisions,
and the court's function is limited to oversight. Telling the two apart, and then securing judi-
cial recognition of its subordinate role in the oversight context, has been a constant chal-
lenge..It is not made easier by recognition that the intensity of the court's supervisory role
varies with context. Still, acceptance of the proposition that courts are ultimately responsible
for some issues, and agencies are responsible for others, is central.
Peter L. Strauss, Overseers or "The Deciders "-The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
815, 816-17 (2008).
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This Article begins in Part I by briefly describing the development of
review standards regarding agency legal determinations. This presentation
is brief because the story is well known. This Part, however, asks the key
questions about standards for judicial review that remain unresolved. Part II
provides examples of the uncertainties that pervade standards of review for
agency legal determinations. These uncertainties are present in Supreme
Court decisions, thus demonstrating that the Supreme Court itself is uncer-
tain about the review framework that it has developed over many years.
Part III presents an integrated understanding of the standards for review of
agency legal determinations, including exercises of discretion. Part IV con-
siders the value of the integrated approach when a court must review a
change in an agency's legal interpretation. Finally, Part V relates the pro-
posed regime of review to the review standards defined by the APA.
I. THE LANDMARKS IN DEFINING MODERN STANDARDS OF REVIEW OF
AGENCY LEGAL (AND DISCRETIONARY) DECISIONS
Before attempting to reconcile the Supreme Court decisions that have
defined the regime for the review of agency legal determinations, this Part
briefly reviews the key decisions and seeks to identify the core principles
that animate this area of the law. This review begins with a summary of
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery ),1 a case that is not generally understood
as a standard of review case. 4 The review then turns to the cases tradition-
ally associated with review of agency legal determinations, beginning with
the Court's decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.," considered along with
Armour & Co. v. Wantock,'6 Skidmore's companion case. These cases from
1944 were decided prior to the enactment of the APA. This Part then re-
views the modern Supreme Court cases that provide the framework for re-
view of agency legal decisions under the APA: Citizens to Preserve Over-
ton Park, Inc. v. Volpe;" Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.;' Chevron
US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; United States v.
Mead Corp.; and National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X
" 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
14 See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 971-
72 (2007) ("The Chenery principle does not itself indicate how demanding a court will be in assessing
the reason provided by the agency. A standard of review-such as the APA's mandate for reversing
agency action that is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law' and the judicial glosses on that mandate-determines how closely the court will scrutinize agency
action." (footnotes omitted)).
15 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
16 323 U.S. 126 (1944).
17 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
18 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
[VOL. 19:14
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Internet Services." The focus of this brief review is on the importance of
the locus of lawmaking authority.
A. Chenery I
Chenery I is most famous for establishing the principle that a court
should allow an agency to exercise administrative discretion, rather than
impose a result on the agency.20 The case, however, also addressed issues of
the source of applicable law that are important to understanding the stan-
dards of judicial review.2 1 The case involved a challenge to an SEC decision
to approve a plan of reorganization only if "preferred stock acquired by the
respondents during the period in which successive reorganization plans
proposed by the management of the company were before the Commission,
was not permitted to participate in the reorganization on an equal footing
with all other preferred stock."22 The SEC reviewed the reorganization plan
pursuant to section seven of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935.23 The agency had to decide "whether the terms of issuance of the new
common stock were 'fair and equitable' or 'detrimental to the interests of
investors' within [section] 7 of the Act."24
The Court concluded that Congress, when it enacted this provision,
had given the agency "broad powers for the protection of the public."25 The
delegation was broad because Congress had not clearly proscribed certain
reorganizations. The Court's decision in the case was a consequence of the
source of the law that the agency purported to apply in reviewing the legali-
ty of the reorganization plan.26 The Court stated:
[BJefore transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied their usual business conse-
quences, they must fall under the ban of some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency
of government authorized to prescribe such standards-either the courts or Congress or an
agency to which Congress has delegated its authority. Congress itself did not proscribe the
respondents' purchases of preferred stock .. . . Established judicial doctrines do not condemn
19 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
20 See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 2, at 563-64 (describing this "enduring proposition" of Che-
nery 1).
21 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) ("Since the decision of the Commis-
sion was explicitly based upon the applicability of principles of equity announced by courts, its validity
must likewise be judged on that basis. The grounds upon which an administrative order must be judged
are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.").
22 Id. at 81.
23 See ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 815-17 (repealed 2005).
24 Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 85.
25 Id at 90-91 (citing legislative history).
26 Id. at 89 ("Since the Commission professed to decide the case before it according to settled
judicial doctrines, its action must be judged by the standards which the Commission itself invoked.").
2011] 5
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these transactions. Nor has the Commission . . . promulgated new general standards of con-
duct. It purported merely to be applying an existing judge-made rule of equity.27
Accordingly, the Court reviewed the agency's decision to determine
whether the company had properly applied the rules regarding the treatment
of insiders in a reorganization that had been imposed by the common law.28
The Court concluded that the agency's understanding of the judge-made
law was incorrect. 29 The agency had the authority to define new standards
pursuant to a delegation from Congress, but the agency had not exercised
its lawmaking power." The Court foreshadowed the development of judi-
cial review standards when it stated that a court must not substitute its view
of the law for an agency's when the agency is exercising lawmaking power
delegated by Congress. 3' When, however, an agency is interpreting the law
defined by another institution, in this case the courts, will review the agen-
cy's interpretation closely.32
Having decided that the agency misinterpreted the legal standard de-
fined in the common law, the Court considered whether it should determine
the standard on reorganization that applies under Section 7 of the Act.33 The
Court concluded that it should not determine the content of the applicable
27 Id. at 92-93.
28 Id. at 93-94.
29 The Court concluded that:
[The agency] explicitly disavowed any purpose of going beyond those [standards] which the
courts had theretofore recognized. Since the Commission professed to decide the case before
it according to settled judicial doctrines, its action must be judged by the standards which the
Commission itself invoked. And judged by those standards, i.e., those which would be en-
forced by a court of equity, we must conclude that the Commission was in error in deeming
its action controlled by established judicial principles.
Id. at 89-90. Justice Black argued in dissent that the Court should have focused only on whether the
substance of the rule was consistent with the statute, rather than the source of the law on which the
agency relied in defining the rule. See Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 100 (Black, J., dissenting).
30 The Court stated:
Determination of what is "fair and equitable" calls for the application of ethical standards to
particular sets of facts. But these standards are not static. In evolving standards of fairness
and equity, the Commission is not bound by settled judicial precedents. Congress certainly
did not mean to preclude the formulation by the Commission of standards expressing a more
sensitive regard for what is right and what is wrong than those prevalent at the time the Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 became law. But the Commission did not in this
case proffer new standards reflecting the experience gained by it in effectuating the legisla-
tive policy.
Id. at 89 (majority opinion).
31 Id. at 94 ("[T]he courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the
considerations underlying the action under review. If the action rests upon an administrative determina-
tion-an exercise of judgment in an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency-of course it must
not be set aside because the reviewing court might have made a different determination were it empo-
wered to do so.").
32 See id. ("[I]f the [agency] action is based upon a determination of law as to which the reviewing
authority of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has misconceived the
law.").
33 Id. at 90, 94.
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legal standard.' Instead, the Court decided that the matter had to be re-
manded to the agency." The agency would then have an opportunity to
consider whether it should exercise the power delegated to it by Congress to
define a new standard for reorganizations. 6 The Court decided, in short,
that a court must not decide what Congress has authorized an agency to
decide."
Chenery I, therefore, embraced more than simply the principle that a
court should remand a matter to an agency with delegated power so that the
agency may exercise that power." The case also established that an agency
decision is reviewed by reference to the source of law that the agency relied
upon as the basis for its decision, with the stringency of judicial review
determined by that source of the law." Finally, the Chenery I court accepted
that an agency decision could be legally flawed even though the statute may
permit the agency's substantive decision.'
B. Skidmore and Armour
Skidmore and Armour were companion cases that both involved the
question of whether employee waiting time may "constitute hours worked,
for which overtime compensation is due [to employees] under the Fair La-
bor Standards Act [("FLSA")]."4 1
Two aspects of these decisions, in particular, help to illuminate the
contemporary understanding of judicial review of agency legal determina-
tions. First, these cases applied the core principle that a court must enforce
the statutory meaning that is clearly fixed by Congress (provided that the
meaning is constitutionally permissible). In Armour, the Court concluded
that the FLSA, as enacted by Congress, had foreclosed an interpretation that
would not permit compensation for any employee waiting time. 42 Having
34 Id. at 94.
35 Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 95.
3 Id. at 88 ("If an order is valid only as a determination of policy or judgment which the agency
alone is authorized to make and which it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service
for an administrative judgment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate
court cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative
agency.").
" See id.
38 See id at 93-95.
39 See id
40 See id
41 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1946).
42 Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 134 (1944) ("We think the Labor Standards Act does
not exclude as working time periods contracted for and spent on duty in the circumstances disclosed
here, merely because the nature of the duty left time hanging heavy on the employees' hands and be-
cause the employer and employee cooperated in trying to make the confinement and idleness incident to
it more tolerable."); see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136 ("For reasons set forth in the Armour case
2011] 7
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reached this conclusion, the Court affirmed the judgment of the district
court and the court of appeals that a portion of the employees' waiting time
was "under the circumstances and the arrangements between the par-
ties ... working time."4 3 Using modern terminology, the Armour Court
rejected the conclusion that the FLSA had a clear meaning that barred com-
pensation for waiting time. 4 The focus of the Court's analysis was on the
statute enacted by Congress."5 The Court did not consider the views of the
administrative agency in interpreting how the statute resolved this legal
issue." The Armour decision, using the terminology of Chevron, is a step-
one decision.47
Skidmore, Armour's more famous companion case, illuminates the in-
terpretative method of a court that must interpret an ambiguous statute
when an agency has played no lawmaking role in the implementation of the
statute." The judgment that the Court reviewed in Skidmore followed from
the lower court's decision that the FLSA barred compensation for any wait-
ing time."9 This is the legal interpretation that the Supreme Court rejected in
Armour based on the FLSA's clear meaning."o
In the Court's view, Congress had given courts," rather than an agen-
cy,52 the role of making the legal determination about whether employees
had to be compensated under the Act.53 The Court recognized that an agen-
cy, in this case the Administrator of the Wages and Hours Division,
has accumulated a considerable experience in the problems of ascertaining working time in
employments involving periods of inactivity and a knowledge of the customs prevailing in
reference to their solution. From these he is obliged to reach conclusions as to conduct with-
decided herewith we hold that no principle of law found either in the statute or in Court decisions prec-
ludes waiting time from also being working time.").
43 Armour, 323 U.S. at 134.
4 See id
45 Id. at 132-34.
46 See id. at 134.
47 See infra Part II.B.
48 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-39 (1944).
49 Id. at 136.
50 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
51 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137 ("The law does not impose an arrangement upon the parties. It
imposes upon the courts the task of finding what the arrangement was."); id. at 136-37 ("We have not
attempted to, and we cannot, lay down a legal formula to resolve cases so varied in their facts as are the
many situations in which employment involves waiting time. Whether in a concrete case such time falls
within or without the Act is a question of fact to be resolved by appropriate findings of the trial court.").
52 Id. at 137 ("Congress did not utilize the services of an administrative agency to find facts and to
determine in the first instance whether particular cases fall within or without the Act. Instead, it put this
responsibility on the courts.").
53 Id
54 See id. (noting that Congress "did create the office of Administrator, impose upon him a variety
of duties, endow him with powers to inform himself of conditions in industries and employments sub-
ject to the Act, and put on him the duties of bringing injunction actions to restrain violations").
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out the law, so that he should seek injunctions to stop it, and that within the law, so that he
has no call to interfere. He has set forth his views of the application of the Act under differ-
ent circumstances in an interpretative bulletin and in informal rulings. They provide a prac-
tical guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest
in its enforcement will seek to apply it.s5
In these circumstances, where the statute's meaning is not clear (and is
accordingly ambiguous) and an agency has not been delegated responsibili-
ty to define the law," a court must decide how the statute applies to the
uncertain circumstance. The Skidmore Court decided that a court's legal
interpretation might be properly informed by the interpretation adopted by
the agency that administers the statute." The court looks to the agency's
interpretation not because the agency's interpretation is formally binding,
but rather because the agency's experience may be useful by providing
"guidance," as the court itself decides what the statute means when apply-
ing the statute in a particular case."
In sum, Skidmore and Armour established early on in the administra-
tive era that Congress plays the critical role of providing clear statutory
meaning when it wishes to do so, and binds both courts and agencies in that
situation." Congress also plays the critical role of defining whether courts
or agencies will play the decisive role in giving legal meaning to an ambi-
guous statutei6 When a court has the authority to define the legal rule, it
55 Id. at 137-38.
56 The Court's judgment about the legal significance of an agency's interpretation of a statute is
determined by Congress in the statute. Congress may directly define the deference that a court owes to
an agency interpretation. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139 ("There is no statutory provision as to what, if
any, deference courts should pay to the Administrator's conclusions."). The Court also suggested that
judicial deference to an agency's legal determination may be a consequence of the formality of proce-
dures that Congress has imposed on the agency's decisionmaking. See id. ("The rulings of this Adminis-
trator are not reached as a result of hearing adversary proceedings in which he finds facts from evidence
and reaches conclusions of law from findings of fact. They are not, of course, conclusive, even in the
cases with which they directly deal, much less in those to which they apply only by analogy. They do
not constitute an interpretation of the Act or a standard for judging factual situations which binds a
district court's processes, as an authoritative pronouncement of a higher court might do.").
57 Id at 140.
58 The Skidmore Court famously stated in this regard that:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this
Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority; do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thorough-
ness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
to control.
Id.
59 See id. at 137-39; Armour, 323 U.S. at 132-34.
60 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 137-39.
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may be persuaded by the agency, but the court does not defer to the agen-
cy's view of the law."
C. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
The next important decision in the series is Overton Park. In Overton
Park, the Supreme Court provided both a summary of the bases for judicial
review as articulated in the APA and an initial description of "arbitrary or
capricious" review.62 The Court reviewed a decision of the Secretary of
Transportation to permit a federal highway route to be constructed through
a local park.' The provisions of two federal statutes,6M
prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from authorizing the use of federal funds to finance
the construction of highways through public parks if a "feasible and prudent" alternative
route exists. If no such route is available, the statutes allow him to approve construction
through parks only if there has been "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the park.
65
The Court concluded at the outset that judicial review of the Secre-
tary's decision was available because Congress had not precluded it,' and
because the agency's decision was not "committed to agency discretion."'6
In reaching this latter conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that the
Secretary had broad discretion regarding the use of parklands for highways
because a nonpark route was required only if "prudent," as well as feasi-
ble.6 ' The Court concluded:
Congress clearly did not intend that cost and disruption of the community were to be ignored
by the Secretary. But the very existence of the statutes indicates that protection of parkland
was to be given paramount importance. The few green havens that are public parks were not
to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or
61 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.6 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In my view this [Skidmore deference] doctrine (if it can be called that) is inco-
herent, both linguistically and practically. To defer is to subordinate one's own judgment to another's. If
one has been persuaded by another, so that one's judgment accords with the other's, there is no room for
deferral-only for agreement. Speaking of 'Skidmore deference' to a persuasive agency position does
nothing but confuse."); see also Bressman, supra note 7, at 1467 ("Skidmore deference, though phrased
as 'deference,' actually allocates interpretive control to courts.").
62 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971).
63 Id at 406.
6 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 18(a), 82 Stat. 815, 823-24 (1968);
Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(t), 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966).
65 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 405 (footnotes omitted).
66 Id.at410.
67 Id. at413 (internal quotation marks omitted).
68 See id. at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Respondents argue ... that the requirement
that there be no other 'prudent' route requires the Secretary to engage in a wide-ranging balancing of
competing interests.").
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community disruption resulting from alternative routes reached extraordinary magnitudes. If
the statutes are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the destruction of park-
land unless he finds that alternative routes present unique problems.69
In examining the development of judicial review of agency legal con-
clusions, two parts of the Court's discussion regarding the APA standards
of review are important. Describing the review required by the APA, the
Court said, "[t]he court is first required to decide whether the Secretary
acted within the scope of his authority."" The Court relied on its earlier
discussion of the statutory limits placed on the Secretary's decision in its
"delineation of the scope of the Secretary's authority and discretion."" The
Court then reiterated its view about the legal limits defined by the statute:
Congress has specified only a small range of choices that the Secretary can make. Also in-
volved in this initial inquiry is a determination of whether on the facts the Secretary's deci-
sion can reasonably be said to be within that range. The reviewing court must consider
whether the Secretary properly construed his authority to approve the use of parkland as li-
mited to situations where there are no feasible alternative routes or where feasible alternative
routes involve uniquely difficult problems. And the reviewing court must be able to find that
the Secretary could have reasonably believed that in this case there are no feasible alterna-
tives or that alternatives do involve unique problems.72
In the Court's view, the Secretary violated statutory requirements if his
choice of highway route failed to comply with the standards that the Court
itself decided had been defined by Congress.
The second significant aspect of Overton Park is its articulation of the
meaning of "arbitrary or capricious" review under the APA:
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a considera-
tion of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although
this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.73
The Court's articulation of the standard reflects ambivalence toward subs-
tantive review. The focus is on how the agency reached its decision, al-
though some substantive review authority is retained.
Overton Park accordingly recognized two components of judicial re-
view of an agency's application of the law: the substantive limits imposed
by the statute and the process of the agency's decisionmaking.
69 Id. at 412-13 (footnotes omitted). The Court famously stated, regarding Congress's intent, that
"[b]ecause of this ambiguity [in the legislative history of the two statutes] it is clear that we must look
primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent." Id. at 412 n.29.
70 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
71 Id at 415-16.
72 Id.at416.
73 Id. (citations omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
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D. State Farm
Twelve years after Overton Park, the Supreme Court returned to the
question of the nature of arbitrary or capricious review. State Farm in-
volved a challenge to the efforts of the newly elected Reagan Administra-
tion to deregulate the area of passive restraints for automobiles.74 The safety
requirements that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
("NHTSA") rescinded had been established in the implementation of:
[T]he National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act). The Act, created for the
purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from
traffic accidents," directs the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate to issue motor ve-
hicle safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety,
and shall be stated in objective terms." In issuing these standards, the Secretary is directed to
consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard "is
reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle, and the "ex-
tent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes" of the Act.
75
The Court held that the rescission decision was subject to review under
the arbitrary or capricious standard because the safety standards had been
defined by informal rulemaking.76 The Court's application of that review
standard built upon the analysis in Overton Park. In particular, the Court's
analysis retained the uncertain distinction that Overton Park had drawn
between the substance of the agency decision and its decisionmaking
process:
The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard is narrow and a court is
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." In reviewing that explanation, we
must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Normally, an agency rule would be arbi-
trary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explana-
tion for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. The
reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; we may not
supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given. We will,
74 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 36-37 (1983).
The agency had acted by regulation to rescind the requirement that auto manufacturers include passive
restraints, comprised of either airbags or passive seatbelts, in their new models. Id. at 37-38.
75 Id at 33-34 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1392(a),
1392(f)(1), 1392(3)-(4) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
76 See id at 41.
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however, "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be
discerned."77
While applying this standard, the Court rejected the conclusion that the
agency's rescission was unlawful, because Congress, through its post-
enactment actions, had required the use of passive restraints by acquiescing
in prior administrative actions." In the review terminology of Overton
Park, the Court rejected the argument that the agency's rescission had ex-
ceeded the scope of its legal authority." In our modem review terminology,
the Court rejected a claim that rescission was barred under the first step of
Chevron.
After concluding that the statute did not bar the substance of the agen-
cy decision, the Court considered the adequacy of the agency's decision-
making process.o The Court concluded, unanimously, that the agency vi-
olated the arbitrary or capricious standard because it had failed to consider
whether to mandate the exclusive use of either airbags or the continuous
seatbelt."' This was arbitrary or capricious because despite the highway
safety statute, the agency failed to account for the highway safety objective
in rescinding the passive restraint requirement.82 The agency rescinded the
requirement without assessing whether safety would be promoted by simply
7 Id. at 43 (citations omitted) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962), Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974),
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, and SEC v. Chenery Corp (Chenery 1), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). The
arbitrary or capricious review standard does impose additional, general limits on an agency's decision-
making. See Eagle Broad. Grp., Ltd. v. FCC, 563 F.3d 543, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("[A]n agency may not
treat like cases differently. And an agency's unexplained departure from precedent must be overturned
as arbitrary and capricious." (citation omitted) (quoting Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 769 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), and Freeman Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
78 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 45 ("While an agency's interpretation of a statute may be con-
firmed or ratified by subsequent congressional failure to change that interpretation, in the cases before
us, even an unequivocal ratification-short of statutory incorporation-of the passive restraint standard
would not connote approval or disapproval of an agency's later decision to rescind the regulation. That
decision remains subject to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard." (citations omitted)); id. at 59 n.*
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[1]n this case, as the Court correctly con-
cludes, Congress has not required the agency to require passive restraints." (citation omitted)).
79 Id. at 45 (majority opinion) ("Even were we inclined to rely on inchoate legislative action, the
inferences to be drawn fail to suggest that NHTSA acted improperly in rescinding Standard 208.").
80 Id at 48.
81 See id. at 57-58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I agree that, since the
airbag and continuous spool automatic seatbelt were explicitly approved in the Standard the agency was
rescinding, the agency should explain why it declined to leave those requirements intact. In this case, the
agency gave no explanation at all. Of course, if the agency can provide a rational explanation, it may
adhere to its decision to rescind the entire Standard.").
82 See id. at 48 (majority opinion).
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requiring all manufacturers to use the same safety technology." The statute,
in other words, defined the factors that the agency had to consider in mak-
ing its regulatory decisions.' The agency failed to implement the statute by
failing to account for those factors."
The Court's application of the arbitrary or capricious review standard
was much more elaborate than in Overton Park. The State Farm decision
retained, however, the uncertainty about whether arbitrary or capricious
review is only concerned with the agency's decisionmaking process, or
whether it is also concerned with the agency's substantive decision." The
Court indicated that employing the proper decisionmaking process will
foreclose the permissibility of certain reasons for substantive decisions,87 in
particular the assessment of regulatory costs."
In sum, State Farm retained the core view that Congress may itself de-
fine the content of the law for the agency." In the absence of clearly de-
fined law,' the agency's application of the law is reviewed under the arbi-
83 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48 ("Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the
agency, the mandate of the Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the logical response to the
faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the installation of airbags. At the very least this alter-
native way of achieving the objectives of the Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons
given for its abandonment. But the agency not only did not require compliance through airbags, it also
did not even consider the possibility in its 1981 rulemaking. Not one sentence of its rulemaking state-
ment discusses the airbags-only option.").
8 Id. at 55 (discussing the factors necessary to consider).
85 See id at 56.
86 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 816-17.
87 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 49 ("[T]he [Motor Vehicle Safety] Act was necessary because the
industry was not sufficiently responsive to safety concerns. The Act intended that safety standards not
depend on current technology and could be 'technology-forcing' in the sense of inducing the develop-
ment of superior safety design. If, under the statute, the agency should not defer to the industry's failure
to develop safer cars, which it surely should not do, afortiori it may not revoke a safety standard which
can be satisfied by current technology simply because the industry has opted for an ineffective seatbelt
design." (citation omitted)).
88 Id. at 54-55 ("The agency's conclusion that the incremental costs of the requirements were no
longer reasonable was predicated on its prediction that the safety benefits of the regulation might be
minimal. Specifically, the agency's fears that the public may resent paying more for the automatic belt
systems is expressly dependent on the assumption that detachable automatic belts will not produce more
than 'negligible safety benefits.' When the agency reexamines its findings as to the likely increase in
seatbelt usage, it must also reconsider its judgment of the reasonableness of the monetary and other
costs associated with the Standard. In reaching its judgment, NHTSA should bear in mind that Congress
intended safety to be the pre-eminent factor under the [Motor Vehicle Safety] Act ..... (citation omit-
ted)).
89 Id at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
9 See id ("A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfect-
ly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to
assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration."
(footnote omitted)); see also id. at 59 n.* ("Of course, a new administration may not refuse to enforce
[VOt. 19:114
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trary or capricious standard.9 1 That standard is concerned primarily with the
agency's decisionmaking process.
E. Chevron
The next in this series of Supreme Court decisions is the most famous:
Chevron. The Court reviewed a regulation promulgated by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ("EPA") that broadly defined a stationary source
under the Clean Air Act.92 This narrowed the circumstances under which
modifications of an existing source would trigger the stringent requirements
for a new stationary source.93
The decision is most famous94 for defining the two-step approach for
reviewing agency legal determinations:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is con-
fronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the sta-
tute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.95
In describing these steps and their application to the legal issues in
Chevron, the Court established the foundations for the modern understand-
ing of judicial review of agency legal interpretations.' The Court's view of
the first step was quite clear: Congress has the power to define the applica-
ble law." When a court determines that Congress has defined the law be-
cause of the law's clarity," that law governs." Courts determine the clarity
laws of which it does not approve, or to ignore statutory standards in carrying out its regulatory func-
tions.").
91 See id. at 42-43 (majority opinion).
92 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40 (1984).
Id. at 840 (describing the netting out effect of the so-called bubble concept).
94 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
95 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243 (footnotes omitted).
96 See Sunstein, supra note 2, at 188 ("[T]he [Chevron] decision has become foundational, even a
quasi-constitutional text-the undisputed starting point for any assessment of the allocation of authority
between federal courts and administrative agencies.").
9 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84243 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
98 Id. at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must
reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.").
99 Id. ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress
had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.").
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of legislative directives by "employing traditional tools of statutory con-
struction."'" The Court concluded in Chevron that Congress had no clear
intent regarding a broad definition of stationary source.101
Accordingly, the Court proceeded to the second step of the analysis-
the step at which deference is owed to an agency's interpretation. 02 The
Court's motivation for granting deference to agencies came from the
Court's view that statutory ambiguity means that Congress has delegated
interpretive authority103 to agencies and not courts."
The second part of the Court's analysis, "whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute,"'o is less clear regard-
ing the nature of the deference to the agency. Part of the Court's discussion
suggested that the agency's interpretation was lawful because the agency
considered the proper factors-"the economic interest in permitting capital
improvements to continue and the environmental interest in improving air
100 Id.; see also id. at 851 ("The legislative history of the portion of the 1977 Amendments dealing
with nonattainment areas does not contain any specific comment on the 'bubble concept' or the question
whether a plantwide definition of a stationary source is permissible under the permit program."); id. at
862 ("We find that the legislative history as a whole is silent on the precise issue before us. It is, howev-
er, consistent with the view that the EPA should have broad discretion in implementing the policies of
the 1977 Amendments.").
101 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 ("[W]e agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress did not have a
specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept in these cases.").
102 Professor Elliott, who served as General Counsel at the EPA, see Elliott, supra note 2, at 9, has
written that the deference to agencies required by step two of Chevron "reduced the relative power of
lawyers within agencies and strengthened the voices of officials in other disciplines." Id. at 2; id. at 3
("In the environmental area, the [EPA] and other agencies gradually internalized and adapted to the
additional interpretive discretion (i.e., the expanded power) that Chevron provided them. Accordingly,
EPA and other agencies are now more adventurous when interpreting and elaborating statutory law."
(footnote omitted)); see also Bamberger, supra note 2, at 66 ("[Alfter Chevron, when a statute is un-
clear, the resulting discretion belongs generally to the agency charged with its administration. That
agency-armed with the very expertise and political sensitivity courts lack-may (so long as it meets a
requisite level of decisionmaking formality) adopt any policy permitted by the scope of statutory inde-
terminacy.").
103 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there
is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of
a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." (footnote
omitted)).
104 See id. at 842 ("The basic legal error of the Court of Appeals was to adopt a static judicial
definition of the term 'stationary source' when it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded
that definition."); id. at 843 n. II ("The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.").
105 Id. at 843.
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quality"-when it established the regulation.'" Indeed, the Court suggested
that it should not play any role in assessing policy judgments made by the
political departments of the federal government.'O7 Notwithstanding the
Court's abjuring a role in determining substantive policy, the Court's deci-
sion contained language indicating that it based its decision to uphold the
regulation on its own view that the regulation's substance was reasona-
ble.08
The Court's discussion of Chevron deference also included sugges-
tions for how this deference differs from Skidmore deference.' The differ-
ence is most striking in the Court's discussion about the relevance of the
agency's change in position."o A change in agency position was a reason
for reduced deference under Skidmore."' Under the Chevron regime, a
court owes deference to an agency's interpretation despite changes in posi-
tion by the agency."2 In other respects, however, the Court suggested that
106 Id. at 851 (noting that the legislative history "plainly disclose[s] that in the permit program
Congress sought to accommodate the conflict between the economic interest in permitting capital im-
provements to continue and the environmental interest in improving air quality").
107 The Court stated that:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Govern-
ment. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis
of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has de-
legated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely
upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices-
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve,
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the sta-
tute in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made
by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:
"Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
Id. at 865-66 (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)).
108 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 ("[W]e ... conclude that the EPA's use of that [bubble] concept
here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make."); id. at 865 ("[T]he Administrator's interpre-
tation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests .... ); id. at 866 ("We
hold that the EPA's definition of the term 'source' is a permissible construction of the statute which
seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth. 'The Regulations which
the Administrator has adopted provide what the agency could allowably view as . . . [an] effective
reconciliation of these twofold ends . (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961))).
109 See id. at 863-65 (discussing the reasons for allowing greater deference to the agency in this
case).
11 See id. at 863 ("The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the
term 'source' does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded
the agency's interpretation of the statute.").
Il See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
I12 The Chevron Court stated in this regard that:
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Chevron deference is motivated by the same motivations that animated
Skidmore deference: agency experience and expertise."'
In sum, Chevron's creation of a deference approach to agency legal
determinations provided clarity in some respects, but lacked clarity in oth-
ers. It is noteworthy that the Court completely ignored the APA in its dis-
cussion of the deference owed to agencies." 4
F. Mead
Mead is the next case in the jurisprudence defining the modern ap-
proach to judicial review of agency legal and discretionary determina-
tions."' Decided more than fifteen years after Chevron, Mead determined
the relationship between Skidmore deference and Chevron deference." 6 In
resolving this question, the Court reiterated its consistent view that Con-
gress has the authority to define the degree of deference owed to an agency
decision."'
The Mead Court reviewed a tariff classification ruling by the Customs
Service."' Mead Corp. imported day planners and the agency had to decide
the customs classification for the product.' It selected the classification
Our review of the EPA's varying interpretations of the word "source" both before and after
the 1977 Amendments-convinces us that the agency primarily responsible for administering
this important legislation has consistently interpreted it flexibly-not in a sterile textual va-
cuum, but in the context of implementing policy decisions in a technical and complex arena.
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term "source"
does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the
agency's interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved
in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider vary-
ing interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64. Indeed, the Court indicates that an agency's changes in interpretation
support a conclusion that the statute itself was not clear. Id. at 864 ("[T]he fact that the agency has
adopted different definitions in different contexts adds force to the argument that the definition itself is
flexible, particularly since Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the
statute.").
113 See id. at 865 ("[T]he Administrator's interpretation . .. is entitled to deference: the regulatory
scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,
and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies." (footnotes omitted)).
114 Although the Clean Air Act itself prescribes standards of judicial review for rulemaking by the
EPA, see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006), those review standards are almost identical in relevant respect
to the review standards in the APA, see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
115 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
116 See id. ("We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under Chevron,
there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but we hold that
under Skidmore . . . the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness." (citation
omitted)).
117 See id
18 Idd at 221-22.
Il9 See idat 224-25.
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that was subject to a tariff of 4 percent, as opposed to the alternative tariff-
free classification.120 The court of appeals had reversed the agency's deci-
sion, after granting no deference to the agency's ruling.12'
In order to review the agency ruling, the Court had to decide the
amount of deference to accord the agency decision.122 The Court's decision
developed from its view that Congress intended that only certain agency
legal determinations would receive Chevron deference.123 The Court con-
cluded that Congress would not want such strong deference to be accorded
to an agency determination that lacks the force of agency-defined law.'24
Agency-defined law is not present if either the agency lacked the delegated
authority to make decisions with the force of law or the agency did not ex-
ercise its delegated lawmaking power.125
The Court suggested that there was a longstanding recognition that
Chevron deference applied only when the agency was the source of law
because it had acted in the exercise of lawmaking power delegated by Con-
gress:
Since 1984, we have identified a category of interpretive choices distinguished by an addi-
tional reason for judicial deference. This Court in Chevron recognized that Congress not only
engages in express delegation of specific interpretive authority, but that "[s]ometimes the
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit." Congress, that is,
may not have expressly delegated authority or responsibility to implement a particular provi-
sion or fill a particular gap. Yet it can still be apparent from the agency's generally conferred
authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able
to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the
enacted law, even one about which "Congress did not actually have an intent" as to a particu-
lar result. When circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing court has no
business rejecting an agency's exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a par-
ticular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency's chosen resolution seems unwise, but
is obliged to accept the agency's position if Congress has not previously spoken to the point
at issue and the agency's interpretation is reasonable; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (a reviewing
120 See id.
121 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 226-27.
124 See id.
125 The Court held that:
[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron de-
ference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a
variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent. The Customs
ruling at issue here fails to qualify ....
Id.
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court shall set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").1
26
In addition to identifying the usual characteristics of agency determi-
nations that receive Chevron deference,'27 the Court enumerated several
determinations that have not received such deference. 2 s The Court then
considered the nature of the Customs Service ruling at issue in Mead and
concluded that Chevron deference was not appropriate.'29
Having decided that Chevron deference was not proper, the Court con-
sidered whether the Customs Service ruling should receive any deference.'30
The Court elected to apply Skidmore deference."' Skidmore, of course, had
126 Id at 229 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-46 (1984)). Note how the Court analogizes step two of the
Chevron analysis to arbitrary or capricious review.
127 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31 ("[T]he overwhelming number of our cases applying Chevron
deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. That said,
and as significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure
here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when
no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded. The fact that the tariff classifica-
tion here was not a product of such formal process does not alone, therefore, bar the application of
Chevron." (citation and footnotes omitted)).
128 See id at 234 ("In sum, classification rulings are best treated like 'interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.' They are beyond the Chevron pale."
(citation omitted) (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000))); id. at 232
("[P]recedential value alone does not add up to Chevron entitlement; interpretive rules may sometimes
function as precedents, and they enjoy no Chevron status as a class." (citation omitted)).
129 See id at 231 ("There are, nonetheless, ample reasons to deny Chevron deference here. The
authorization for classification rulings, and Customs's practice in making them, present a case far re-
moved not only from notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably sug-
gesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them
here."); id. at 234 ("The statutory changes reveal no new congressional objective of treating classifica-
tion decisions generally as rulemaking with force of law, nor do they suggest any intent to create a
Chevron patchwork of classification rulings, some with force of law, some without.").
130 See id
131 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 ("To agree with the Court of Appeals that Customs ruling letters do
not fall within Chevron is not, however, to place them outside the pale of any deference whatever.
Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit some
deference whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and informa-
tion' available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial under-
standings of what a national law requires." (citation omitted) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139 (1944))); id. at 235 ("There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here, where the
regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized experience to
bear on the subtle questions in this case: whether the daily planner with room for brief daily entries falls
under 'diaries,' when diaries are grouped with 'notebooks and address books, bound; memorandum
pads, letter pads and similar articles,' and whether a planner with a ring binding should qualify as
'bound,' when a binding may be typified by a book, but also may have 'reinforcements or fittings of
metal, plastics, etc.' A classification ruling in this situation may therefore at least seek a respect propor-
tional to its 'power to persuade.' Such a ruling may surely claim the merit of its writer's thoroughness,
[VOL. 19:120
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not involved an exercise of agency lawmaking authority, because the agen-
cy had lacked lawmaking power. 3 2 The Mead Court then remanded the case
to the lower courts for further proceedings.' The Court's judgment rein-
forced the effect of applying Skidmore deference: it is the court that has the
lawmaking power to interpret the statute.'34 Courts are to exercise that in-
terpretive power after accounting for the agency determination and accord-
ing it the proper deference based on the Skidmore factors.'
In sum, Mead reinforced the principle that Congress determines the
degree of deference courts owe to agency legal interpretations.'36 This prin-
ciple applies even though the judiciary is the institution that necessarily
decides what Congress had intended as the proper amount of deference."'
When an agency exercises delegated lawmaking power, the court must ac-
cept the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute."' When an agency
is not exercising delegated lawmaking power, the court interprets the statute
giving appropriate deference, under the circumstances, to the agency's in-
terpretation, but deciding for itself the meaning of the statute.
G. Brand X
The last Supreme Court decision in this series is Brand X. This case is
important because it reinforced many of the principles of deference that
emerged through the line of cases reviewed so far. It also clarified the au-
thority of an agency to interpret an ambiguous statute when a court has pre-
viously interpreted that same language without an agency's prior exercise
of delegated lawmaking power.
logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight." (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U.S.C. § 1202, subsec.
4820.10.20 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995), U.S. CUSTOMS SERv., HARMONIZED COMMODITY DESCRIPTION
AND CODING SYSTEM EXPLANATORY NOTES TO HEADING 4820, at 687, and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
132 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
133 Mead, 533 U.S. at 238-39 ("Since the Skidmore assessment called for here ought to be made in
the first instance by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or the [Court of International Trade],
we go no firther than to vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.").
134 See id at 227 ("The Customs ruling at issue here fails to qualify [for Chevron deference],
although the possibility that it deserves some deference under Skidmore leads us to vacate and re-
mand.").
135 See id. at 227-28.
136 See id at 236-37 ("The Court's choice has been to tailor deference to variety. This acceptance
of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to recognize more than one variety of judicial defe-
rence, just as the Court has recognized a variety of indicators that Congress would expect Chevron
deference." (footnote omitted)).
137 See id. at 227.
138 See id.
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The Court reviewed a regulation promulgated by the Federal Commu-
nications Commission ("FCC"), in which the agency provided that "cable
companies that sell broadband Internet service do not provide 'telecommu-
nications servic[e]' as the Communications Act defines that term, and
hence are exempt from mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title
II."'" The court of appeals held that the regulation was unlawful due to its
holding in an earlier action "that cable modem service was a 'telecommuni-
cations service."'l40
The order of the Court's analysis is noteworthy: rather than decide
whether the legal issue is resolved at Chevron step one, the Court first con-
sidered whether the agency receives Chevron deference for its action.14' The
Court's analytic approach accordingly treated the Mead inquiry as step zero
of the Chevron analysis, rather than as step one and a half.42 The Court
concluded that the FCC regulations properly received Chevron, rather than
Skidmore, deference. 43
In concluding that the Chevron regime applied, the Court rejected the
argument that an agency should not receive deference from a court when its
legal position has changed.'" The Court reiterated its view that the Chevron
regime provided agencies with the ability to change their interpretations of
ambiguous statutes.'45 The agency must, however, accompany any change
in legal interpretation with an adequate explanation of the reasons for the
change.'
139 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-74 (2005)
(alteration in original).
140 Id. at 979-80 (citing AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877-80 (9th Cir. 2000)). The
Supreme Court noted that "the court in that case was not reviewing an administrative proceeding and the
Commission was not a party to the case." Id. at 980.
141 Id
142 This order of analysis is discussed infra Parts III.A-B.
143 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980-81 ("The Chevron framework governs our review of the Com-
mission's construction. Congress has delegated to the Commission the authority to 'execute and en-
force' the Communications Act and to 'prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out the provisions' of the Act. These provisions give the Commission the au-
thority to promulgate binding legal rules; the Commission issued the order under review in the exercise
of that authority; and no one questions that the order is within the Commission's jurisdiction. Hence, as
we have in the past, we apply the Chevron framework to the Commission's interpretation of the Com-
munications Act." (citations omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201 (2000), and AT&T v. Iowa Utils.
Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1999))).
144 See id at 981.
145 Id. ("Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation
under the Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpreta-
tion to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure
Act.").
146 See id at 981-82 ("[C]hange is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency. An initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency ... must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis, for example, in response to changed
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The Court also addressed the legal significance of a prior judicial in-
terpretation of the statute now being interpreted by the agency in the exer-
cise of delegated lawmaking authority.'47 The Court concluded that a
court's decision forecloses an alternate agency interpretation only if the
holding states that the statute unambiguously compels the court's interpre-
tation.14 The Court believed that Congress intended this limited legal effect
of judicial interpretations and intentionally avoided a situation where the
legal interpretation of a court may fix the legal interpretation merely be-
cause an agency had not yet exercised its lawmaking power.'49 The Court
distinguished this legal effect, from the legal effect of a judicial interpreta-
tion of a statute when there is no basis for Chevron deference: there, the
court's interpretation binds the agency."so In this context, Congress is the
source of the law and the court is the institution that determines the intent of
Congress. The Court concluded that the prior decision relied upon by the
court of appeals did not bind the agency because the court had not held the
statute to be unambiguous."'
Having resolved these preliminary issues, the Court proceeded to its
Chevron analysis.'52 The Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous:
factual circumstances, or a change in administrations. That is no doubt why in Chevron itself, this Court
deferred to an agency interpretation that was a recent reversal of agency policy." (second alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996), and
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
147 See id. at 982-83.
148 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83 ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that
its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion.... Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency con-
struction."); id. at 985 ("Before a judicial construction of a statute, whether contained in a precedent or
not, may trump an agency's, the court must hold that the statute unambiguously requires the court's
construction.").
149 Id. at 983 ("A contrary rule would produce anomalous results. It would mean that whether an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to Chevron deference would turn on the order
in which the interpretations issue: If the court's construction came first, its construction would prevail,
whereas if the agency's came first, the agency's construction would command Chevron deference. Yet
whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret a statute does not depend on the
order in which the judicial and administrative constructions occur.").
150 Id. ("In all other respects [than the Chevron deference context], the court's prior ruling remains
binding law (for example, as to agency interpretations to which Chevron is inapplicable).").
151 See id. at 984-85 ("[The Court of Appeals's] prior decision in Portland held only that the best
reading of § 153(46) was that cable modem service was a 'telecommunications service,' not that it was
the only permissible reading of the statute. Nothing in Portland held that the Communications Act
unambiguously required treating cable Internet providers as telecommunications carriers." (citation
omitted)).
152 Id. at 986.
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Because the term "offer" can sometimes refer to a single, finished product and sometimes to
the "individual components in a package being offered" (depending on whether the compo-
nents "still possess sufficient identity to be described as separate objects"), the statute fails
unambiguously to classify the telecommunications component of cable modem service as a
distinct offering. This leaves federal telecommunications policy in this technical and com-
plex area to be set by the Commission, not by warring analogies.
53
The Court majority accordingly disagreed with Justice Scalia, who argued
in dissent that the statute unambiguously foreclosed the FCC interpretation:
After all is said and done, after all the regulatory cant has been translated, and the smoke of
agency expertise blown away, it remains perfectly clear that someone who sells cable-
modem service is "offering" telecommunications. For that simple reason set forth in the sta-
tute, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.1
54
The Court then decided "that the Commission's construction was 'a
reasonable policy choice for the [Commission] to make' at Chevron's
second step."' The Court's analysis in this portion of the decision is diffi-
cult to characterize. The Court's discussion appeared quite similar to the
Chevron step-one analysis in that the Court was focused principally on
whether the agency's substantive conclusions were permitted by the statute:
the Court was not concerned with the agency's decisionmaking process.'
The final portion of the Supreme Court's decision considered the in-
dustry's argument that the regulation was arbitrary or capricious because it
"treat[s] cable modem service differently . from (Digital Subscriber Line
("DSL")] service."' 7 Here, the Court did engage in process-based review of
the agency action, focusing on whether the agency had adequately ex-
plained the basis for its decision. ' The Court concluded that the agency
153 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 991-92 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 1006 (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see
also id. at 988 (majority opinion) ("Seen from the consumer's point of view, the Commission con-
cluded, cable modem service is not a telecommunications offering because the consumer uses the high-
speed wire always in connection with the information-processing capabilities provided by Internet
access, and because the transmission is a necessary component of Internet access . . . ."); id. at 989
("'[O]ffering' can reasonably be read to mean a 'stand-alone' offering of telecommunications, i.e., an
offered service that, from the user's perspective, transmits messages unadulterated by computer
processing. That conclusion follows not only from the ordinary meaning of the word 'offering,' but also
from the regulatory history of the Communications Act.").
154 Id. at 1014 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 997 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)).
156 See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 997-1000.
157 Id.at1000-01.
158 See id. at 1001 n.4 ("Respondents vigorously argue that the Commission's purported inconsis-
tent treatment is a reason for holding the Commission's construction impermissible under [Chevron].
Any inconsistency bears on whether the Commission has given a reasoned explanation for its current
position, not on whether its interpretation is consistent with the statute.").
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had provided a reasonable and sufficient explanation for its regulatory re-
quirements and the distinctions drawn by them.'59
In sum, Brand X confirmed the impact of Mead and applied the theory
of Mead to considerations of the effects of statutory interpretation by the
judicial branch.'" The case also provided an application of the different
steps of the Chevron analysis, as well as arbitrary or capricious review of
the same agency action reviewed under the Chevron regime.
II. UNCERTAINTY AND DISAGREEMENT REGARDING THE STRUCTURE OF
JUDICIAL REvIEw OF AGENCY LEGAL DETERMINATIONS AFTER
BRAND X
Although the previously summarized cases have defined the modern
framework for review of agency legal determinations, subsequent decisions
by the Supreme Court have shown that the framework is uncertain in a va-
riety of respects. This Part uses post-Brand X Supreme Court decisions to
illuminate uncertainties and inconsistencies in the Court's approach to judi-
cial review. This Part is organized by reference to the structure of analysis
that the cases described in the previous Part seem to have adopted.
A. The Order and Content of Mead Analysis
Brand X applied the Mead analysis, used to determine whether the
Chevron rule of deference applied to review of an agency decision, before
the Court determined whether the statute had a clear meaning.'6 ' In two
more recent decisions, the Court decided whether the statute had a clear
meaning before performing the Mead analysis. One of these cases, Massa-
chusetts v. EPA, 62 involved the EPA's decision not to regulate emissions of
greenhouse gases from mobile sources under Section 202(a) of the Clean
Air Act." The Court concluded that "[t]he statutory text forecloses EPA's
reading,"" and stated that deference was accordingly not relevant.' 5 The
other case, Gonzales v. Oregon,'" involved the Court's review of an "Inter-
pretive Rule issued by the Attorney General" that "determines that using
controlled substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical practice
and that dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is unlawful under
19 See id. at 1000-02.
160 See id. at 980-83, 996-97, 1001, 1003.
161 See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
162 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
163 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a) (2006).
164 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528.
165 See id. at 529 n.26.
166 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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the [Controlled Substances Act]."' 6' The Court there did engage in the
Mead analysis, but only after it had summarily decided that the statute was
ambiguous based on the following analysis:
If a statute is ambiguous, judicial review of administrative rulemaking often demands Che-
vron deference; and the rule is judged accordingly. All would agree, we should think, that the
statutory phrase "legitimate medical purpose" is a generality, susceptible to more precise de-
finition and open to varying constructions, and thus ambiguous in the relevant sense."1
Having found ambiguity, the Court engaged in the Mead analysis.69 1In sum,
the Court's decisions reflect uncertainty regarding the order of analysis for
determining the applicability of Chevron deference.
In addition to this uncertainty, the Court's recent decisions are incon-
sistent in the analysis of when Chevron deference should apply; that is the
result of the Mead analysis. In Massachusetts, the Court had concluded that
the statute was clear in not prohibiting the regulation of greenhouse gases. 1'
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by two other Justices, in
which he asserted that the EPA should have received Chevron deference for
its conclusion that the agency lacked authority to regulate greenhouse gases
under the Clean Air Act."' The majority had rejected the argument for Che-
vron deference because the Court viewed the statute as being clear in not
precluding the regulation of greenhouse gases.172 The Court did not other-
wise reject the call for Chevron deference."' This silence is notable because
the agency's decision declining to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
mobile sources was based on the agency's view that Congress had intended
that greenhouse gases must not be regulated under the EPA's Clean Air Act
authority.17 The agency did not purport to be exercising delegated lawmak-
ing power in making this decision."' Given that the agency did not view
itself as the source of the law barring greenhouse gas regulation, the reason-
ing of Mead should plainly have precluded the use of Chevron deference.
None of the Justices makes this very basic point about the inapplicability of
Chevron deference to the agency's decision.
167 Id. at 249.
168 Id. at 258.
169 See id. at 258-69 (concluding that Chevron deference did not apply because the agency lacked
delegated lawmaking power with regard to the rule's limits on the use of controlled substances for
physician-assisted suicide).
170 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
171 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 560 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172 See id at 528-29 & n.26 (majority opinion).
173 See id
174 See id at 511-14.
175 See id.
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A similar inconsistency is present in Negusie v. Holder."' In that case,
the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") determined "whether an alien
who was compelled to assist in persecution can be eligible for asylum or
withholding of removal.""' This is identified as the "persecutor bar"'78 and
the BIA "determined that the persecutor bar applies even if the alien's assis-
tance in persecution was coerced or otherwise the product of duress.""' In
reviewing this decision, the Court exhibited a great deal of uncertainty in its
approach. Initially, the Court did not employ the Mead analysis, deciding
instead that the BIA receives Chevron deference "in interpreting ambiguous
provisions of the [Immigration and Nationality Act]." so When the Court
reviewed the agency's decision, the Court recognized that the agency's
interpretation was determined by what the agency concluded Congress had
provided in the statute.'"' The Court also found that the agency, as well as
the court of appeals, had erred when it concluded that the legal issue had
been resolved by a Supreme Court decision, which had adopted the perse-
cutor bar under a different statutory regime.'82 In short, the Court held that
the agency had viewed the statute itself as having a fixed legal meaning and
the agency thus had not exercised the discretion that Congress had dele-
gated to it via an ambiguous statute. This led the Court to its belated con-
clusion that Chevron deference indeed did not apply to this decision (with-
out any citation to the Mead analysis).' The Court then employed Skid-
more deference and remanded the legal issue to the agency without resolv-
ing the matter itself. '" In sum, recent Supreme Court decisions have re-
flected uncertainty regarding the order and content of the analysis determin-
ing the applicability of Chevron deference.
176 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
177 Id. at ll63.
178 Id at 1162 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1163.
181 See id. at 1164 ("The Government ... asserts that the statute does not allow petitioner's con-
struction. 'The statutory text,' the Government says, 'directly answers that question: there is no excep-
tion' for conduct that is coerced because Congress did not include one." (quoting Brief for Respondent
at I1, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 07-499))).
182 See Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1164-66 (discussing the applicability of Fedorenko v- United States,
449 U.S. 490 (1981)).
183 See id at 1166 ("The Government argues that 'if there were any ambiguity in the text, the
Board's determination that the bar contains no such exception is reasonable and thus controlling.'
Whether such an interpretation would be reasonable, and thus owed Chevron deference, is a legitimate
question; but it is not now before us. The BIA deemed its interpretation to be mandated by Fedorenko,
and that error prevented it from a full consideration of the statutory question here presented." (citation
omitted) (quoting Brief for Respondent at I1, Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009) (No. 07-499))).
184 See id. at 1167-68.
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B. The Nature of Chevron Step-One Analysis
Recent Supreme Court decisions reflect the Court's inconsistency in
determining during the step-one analysis whether the statute is ambiguous
in any respect or whether the statute identifies a clear legal rule in regard to
the agency's interpretation.' This difference in approaches to Chevron step
one is apparent in the two previously described cases regarding the order of
the Mead analysis.'" In Oregon, the Court came very quickly to the conclu-
sion that the statutory provision was ambiguous.' The Court's entire step-
one analysis consisted of the following: "All would agree, we should think,
that the statutory phrase 'legitimate medical purpose' is a generality, sus-
ceptible to more precise definition and open to varying constructions, and
thus ambiguous in the relevant sense."' The Court thereafter spent several
pages' examining the statute's structure and intent, deciding that "the
[Controlled Substance Act]'s prescription requirement does not authorize
the Attorney General to bar dispensing controlled substances for assisted
suicide in the face of a state medical regime permitting such conduct."'"
Although this is treated as the Court's employing Skidmore deference and
putting forth its own interpretation,"' the Court's statutory analysis actually
supported the stronger conclusion that the statute clearly foreclosed the
agency's interpretation. This means that the statute, although ambiguous in
some respects, imposed clear limits that render some agency interpretations
impermissible.
Indeed, this is how the Supreme Court majority interpreted section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act in Massachusetts.9 2 In that case, the Court con-
cluded under step one of Chevron that "[t]he statutory text forecloses
EPA's reading," which was that regulation of emissions of greenhouses
gases from mobile sources was not permitted.'" This was a consequence of
the statute's "sweeping definition of 'air pollutant."'" The Court reached
this holding of clear statutory meaning despite the provision's ambiguity
regarding the exact pollutants that are to be regulated under the statute. " In
short, the Court's use of step-one analysis is inconsistent.
185 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 258-59 (2006).
186 See supra Part Ill.A.
187 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 263-64.
188 Id. at 258.
189 See id. at 269-75.
190 Id. at 268-75.
191 See id
192 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007).
193 See id. at 528.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 557-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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C. The Nature of Chevron Step-Two Analysis
The second step of Chevron is, of course, where the agency is ac-
corded deference.'" Chevron itself found the EPA's interpretation of a "sta-
tionary source" to be reasonable. 97 The Court, however, did not clearly
state whether this review was substantive or process based (i.e., did the
agency consider the proper factors when reaching its decision).' Dicta in
Mead suggested that the step-two review was analogous to arbitrary or ca-
pricious review, which inquires into the agency's decisionmaking
process.' The Court's decision in Brand X found that the agency interpre-
tation was reasonable under Chevron step two, but the analysis focused on
the substance of the agency decision.200
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have not clarified this issue. In
Negusie, Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, took the position that the BIA
had discretion to interpret the ambiguous statute to impose the persecutor
ban.20' That interpretation was permissible, however, only if it was reached
following a consideration of permissible factors:
[G]ood reasons for the agency's current practice exist-reasons adequate to satisfy the re-
quirement that an agency act reasonably in choosing among various possible constructions of
an ambiguous statute. The statute does not mandate the rule precluding the duress defense
but does not foreclose it either; the agency is free to retain that rule so long as the choice to
do so is soundly reasoned, not based on irrelevant or arbitrary factors (like the Fedorenko
precedent). 202
Justice Scalia concluded therefore that an agency interpretation is lawful if
it is not substantively barred by the statute and is determined by a lawful
process.
196 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005) ("Che-
vron established a familiar two-step procedure for evaluating whether an agency's interpretation of a
statute is lawful. At the first step, we ask whether the statute's plain terms 'directly addres[s] the precise
question at issue.' If the statute is ambiguous on the point, we defer at step two to the agency's interpre-
tation so long as the construction is 'a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 845
(1984))); Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 624-25.
197 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 ("[W]e must recognize that the EPA has advanced a reasonable
explanation for its conclusion that the regulations serve the environmental objectives as well.").
198 See id. at 862-64.
199 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
200 See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 997-1000 ("We also conclude that the Commission's construction was
'a reasonable policy choice for the [Commission] to make' at Chevron's second step." (alteration in
original) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845)).
201 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is to agency offi-
cials, not to the Members of this Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose among permissible
interpretations of the statute.").
202 Id. at 1168-69 (emphasis added).
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The Court's recent decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Educa-
tion & Research v. United States,203 however, continued the Court's ambi-
valence toward the nature of Chevron step-two review.2' In that case, the
Court reviewed a regulation promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") to establish "whether doctors who serve as medical residents are
properly viewed as 'student[s]' whose service Congress has exempted from
FICA taxes under 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10)." 20 S After concluding that the
statute was ambiguous20 and that the Chevron standard applied,2" the Court
engaged in a step-two analysis. 208 When summarizing its decision, the Court
stated that "the Treasury Department's rule is a reasonable construction of
what Congress has said" 20-a conclusion that sounds substantive in nature.
The Court's analysis, however, was more process based and addresses how
the agency's interpretation followed from a consideration of factors that the
statute defined as reasonable.2 0
In short, the Court continues to leave uncertain whether the Chevron
step-two analysis is concerned with the substance or the process of the
agency's decisionmaking.
D. The Application of Skidmore Deference
Once it has decided, employing the Mead analysis, that the agency in-
terpretation is subject to Skidmore deference, the Court has been quite in-
consistent in its practice of interpreting the statute. For example, in Mead
itself, the Court held that Skidmore deference applied, but then remanded to
the lower courts to interpret the statute (with appropriate deference to the
agency).211 In Oregon, the Court itself, according Skidmore deference to the
agency position, "conclude[d] the CSA's prescription requirement does not
authorize the Attorney General to bar dispensing controlled substances for
assisted suicide in the face of a state medical regime permitting such con-
duct." 2 12
203 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
204 See id. at 712-13.
205 Id. at 708 (alteration in original).
206 See id. at 711-12.
207 See id. at 714.
208 See id.
209 Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 716.
210 See id. at 715 (discussing how the IRS reasonably "[flocus[ed] on the hours an individual works
and the hours he spends in studies"; "improve[d] administrability"; and "further[ing] the purpose of the
Social Security Act and comport[ing] with this Court's precedent." (second internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Student FICA Exemption, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,404, 76,405 (Dec. 21, 2004))).
211 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238-39 (2001).
212 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274-75 (2006).
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In Negusie, however, the Court declined to resolve the statutory mean-
ing itself and also did not remand the issue to the lower courts for their de-
cision.213 Instead, the Court remanded the legal issue to the agency to allow
the agency to make its own decision with the understanding that it had
committed legal error in its previous understanding of what the statute had
required.214 This resolution appears consistent with the fundamental prin-
ciple of Chenery I.215 Still, Brand X has now made it clear that a court's
interpretation of an ambiguous statute will not bind an agency when the
agency subsequently interprets the statute in an exercise of delegated law-
making authority.216 A legal interpretation of a court will, therefore, not
have the effect of removing an agency's interpretive authority, which was
the Court's concern in Chenery I.217
The Court's decisions thus raise the question of when a court itself
should decide an interpretive issue (employing Skidmore deference and
subject to being superseded by a later agency exercise of lawmaking au-
thority), as opposed to remanding the matter to the agency following the
correction of a legal error. Moreover, the Court pursued its approach in
Negusie without describing the reasons for its decision. Indeed, the Court
did not seem aware of the varied approaches it had taken.
E. The Application ofArbitrary or Capricious Review
One major Supreme Court decision applied the arbitrary or capricious
review standard to an agency's change in position. In FCC v. Fox Televi-
sion Stations, Inc.,218 the Supreme Court reviewed the FCC's decision in a
formal adjudicatory proceeding to modify its indecency standard to permit
213 Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 (2009).
214 Id. ("Because of the important differences between the statute before us and the one at issue in
Fedorenko, we find it appropriate to remand to the agency for its initial determination of the statutory
interpretation question and its application to this case.").
215 See supra Part I.A.
216 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005) ("A
court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Che-
vron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.. . .Only a judicial precedent holding
that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for
the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction."); id. at 985 ("Before a judicial construc-
tion of a statute, whether contained in a precedent or not, may trump an agency's, the court must hold
that the statute unambiguously requires the court's construction.").
217 See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) ("If an order is valid only as a
determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which it has not
made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment. For purposes of
affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court cannot intrude upon the domain which
Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency.").
218 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
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the imposition of penalties for the use of fleeting expletives by broadcas-
ters.219 Prior to this change, the FCC had required that expletives be used
repetitively to result in legal violations.220
The Court's application of the review standard reinforced the under-
standing of arbitrary or capricious review that had evolved in Overton Park
and State Farm.22' The Court's decision reiterated that arbitrary or capri-
cious review focuses on the process, rather than the substance, of the agen-
cy's decision.222 In particular, the Court distinguished between the issue of
whether the agency exercised its discretion reasonably, which is the subject
of arbitrary or capricious review, and the substantive limits that the statute
imposes on the agency.223 The majority also chided the dissenters for seek-
ing to load substantive review into arbitrary or capricious review, which the
majority viewed as resolving only whether the agency exercised its discre-
tion reasonably:
[T]he broadcasters' arguments have repeatedly referred to the First Amendment. If they
mean to invite us to apply a more stringent arbitrary-and-capricious review to agency actions
that implicate constitutional liberties, we reject the invitation. The so-called canon of consti-
tutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be
construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts. We know of no precedent for applying it to
limit the scope of authorized executive action. In the same section authorizing courts to set
aside "arbitrary [or] capricious" agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act separately
provides for setting aside agency action that is "unlawful," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), which of
course includes unconstitutional action. We think that is the only context in which constitu-
tionality bears upon judicial review of authorized agency action. If the Commission's action
here was not arbitrary or capricious in the ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act's "arbitrary [or] capricious" standard; its lawfulness under the Constitution is a
separate question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge.
224
219 Id. at 1805 ("This case concerns the adequacy of the Federal Communications Commission's
explanation of its decision that this sometimes forbids the broadcasting of indecent expletives even
when the offensive words are not repeated.").
220 See id. at 1806.
221 The Court in Fox did clarify how arbitrary or capricious review applied to a change in an agen-
cy interpretation: "We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a re-
quirement thai all agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such
heightened standard." Id. at 1810; see also id. at 1811 (stating that an agency "need not demonstrate to a
court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that
the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This
means that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for
a new policy created on a blank slate").
222 Seeid.atl810-ll.
223 See Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1818 n.7 ("We do not believe that the dead hand of a departed Congres-
sional oversight Committee should constrain the discretion that the text of a statute confers-but the
point is in any event irrelevant in this appeal, which concerns not whether the agency has exceeded its
statutory mandate but whether the reasons for its actions are adequate.").
224 Id. at 1811-12 (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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The Court's decision, in short, supports the principle that, if a statute
permits the agency's substantive interpretation, the agency interpretation is
invalid under the APA only if the agency's decisionmaking process was
flawed.
Having summarized the principal decisions establishing and applying
the review regime for agency legal interpretations, the next Part attempts to
identify a workable approach to judicial review. This Part identifies an ap-
proach that accepts the principles identified by the Court's decisions, and
resolves the questions and uncertainties that remain as lower courts and the
Court itself have tried to apply the framework for judicial review.
III. A CLARIFIED AND INTEGRATED METHOD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AGENCY LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS
This description of the judicial review method follows the example of
Chevron itself and presents a step-by-step approach to the review of agency
applications of law. This method begins where Chevron began: the consid-
eration of the clarity of the statute.
A. Step 1: Determination of Whether the Statute Itself Clearly Defines the
Law225
The first step in judicial review accepts and gives effect to the key
principle defined in the core Supreme Court cases: if Congress itself is the
source of clear law that conflicts with the agency's interpretation, the law as
defined by Congress governs and the contrary agency interpretation must be
rejected. In this regard, the agency interpretation is unlawful without regard
to whether the agency believed that it was merely giving effect to the sta-
tute enacted by Congress or the agency had purported to exercise lawmak-
ing power delegated to it by Congress.226 Although this principle properly
views Congress as providing the source of law that must trump an inconsis-
tent agency interpretation, the judiciary is the governmental institution that
plays the key role in discerning the content of the law that Congress has
established.227 The judiciary determines the content of the law defined by
225 In order to minimize confusion with the Chevron review regime, this Article will use numerals
(e.g., step 1) when referring to the steps it has identified. The Article will use written numbers (e.g., step
one) when referring to Chevron's steps.
226 For this reason, there is no need to engage in the Mead analysis, which determines whether the
agency has acted in the exercise of delegated lawmaking power, prior to the step-one analysis.
227 See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 624, where the authors state that:
At Chevron's first step, courts reviewing administrative constructions should begin by identi-
fying whether congressional instructions clearly either require or preclude the choice the
agency has made or, instead, whether the agency's choice falls within a range of possibilities
permitted by language that Congress has left ambiguous. If the former, statutory meaning is
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Congress using traditional tools and methods of statutory construction.228
Those tools include the canons of construction229 and those methods vary
among jurists.230 Some judges will focus this analysis on whether the statu-
tory text is clear,23 1 while other judges will focus this analysis on the intent
of the legislature, and may account for legislative history, as well as statuto-
ry purpose.232
set; consistent agency interpretations should be upheld on the court's own authority, while
contrary constructions must be rejected. If the latter, agency interpretations that do not fall
within the zone of indeterminacy permitted by the statute's language must be struck down.
This constitutes the scope of the independent judicial task.
Id.; see also Strauss, supra note 12, at 818 ("Defining the areas of ambiguity within which, Chevron
says, agencies have presumptively the leading oar is a part of the independent judicial task of step one.
In the Hearst situation, to be concrete about it, a court would properly identify any classes of worker
who must be regarded as 'employees,' and any classes of worker who may not permissibly be so re-
garded.").
228 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) ("Ifa
court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on
the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect."); Levin, supra note 3, at
1283 ("[Chevron] [s]tep one should be defined to encompass all contentions that a court seeks to resolve
using the 'traditional tools of statutory construction."').
229 But cf Catawba Cnty., N.C. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (declining
to give canon of expressio unius effect of fixing clear meaning of statute delegating authority to agency,
because "[s]ilence . . . may signal permission rather than proscription"); Mich. Citizens for an Indep.
Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that courts should not "reverse an agency
decision merely because it failed to rely on any one of a number of canons of [statutory] construction
that might have shaded the interpretation a few degrees in one direction or another"), aff'd, 493 U.S. 38
(1989). See generally Bamberger, supra note 2, for a detailed discussion of the use of normative canons
and their relation to the Chevron step-one analysis.
230 See Strauss, supra note 12, at 819 ("If, then, Chevron step one is the terrain of independent
(albeit perhaps influenced) judicial judgment, cases resolved at that level have more in common with
other judicial judgments about statutory interpretation than with agency review, as such. Judges will
accept the use of legislative history or not; will be open to liberal or constrained views of the reach of
statutory language; will tend to focus on purposes or on text; and will perhaps be more generous with
the work of Republican-dominated legislatures than Democratic, or vice versa, across the broad range of
statutory interpretation issues.").
231 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-29 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (finding
that text clearly foreclosed agency interpretation); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the majority's consideration of legislative history reflects "an ill-
advised deviation from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language
must be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.").
232 See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007) (Breyer, J.)
("Considerations other than [statutory] language provide us with unusually strong indications that Con-
gress intended to leave the Secretary free to use the calculation method before us . . . ."); cf Catawha
Cnty., 571 F.3d at 35 ("To be sure, a statute may foreclose an agency's preferred interpretation despite
such textual ambiguities if its structure, legislative history, or purpose makes clear what its text leaves
opaque.").
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The relevance of the agency's interpretation to this judicial determina-
tion of the statute's clear meaning is limited. 233 If the agency has itself en-
gaged in an analysis of the meaning of the text or the intent of the legisla-
ture, a court may find the agency's inquiry useful as the court itself resolves
the issue of the statute's clarity.234 Moreover, a consistent interpretation of
the statute by an agency provides evidence that the statute does, indeed,
have a clear meaning.235 If the court were to agree with the agency that the
statute was, indeed, clear in the respect that the agency found it to be, the
court would affirm the agency's interpretation simply because the agency
233 For an example of the Court's reliance on consistent agency practice to interpret a statute's
clear meaning, see New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2641-42 (2010) ("[O]ur interpre-
tation is consistent with the longstanding practice of the Board.... Although the Board has throughout
its history allowed two members of a three-member group to issue decisions when one member of a
group was disqualified from a case, the Board has not (until recently) allowed two members to act as a
quorum of a defunct three-member group. Instead, the Board concedes that its practice was to reconsti-
tute a delegee group when one group member's term expired. That our interpretation of the delegation
provision is consistent with the Board's longstanding practice is persuasive evidence that it is the correct
one, notwithstanding the Board's more recent view." (footnotes and citations omitted)). See also Kasten
v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1333 (2010) (concluding that the statute
had clear meaning, Court relied on the "functional consideration[]" that the agency had consistently
interpreted the statute to have that same meaning); Strauss, supra note 12, at 818 ("As part of its step
one determination, a court might well turn to a responsible agency's judgment about the matter as one
weight to be considered on the scales the court is using. That is, Skidmore deference is one of those
'traditional tools of statutory interpretation' that bear on a court's independent conclusion about the
extent of agency authority.").
234 See Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Inter-
preting Law or Changing Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 539, 603 n.237 (2001) (discussing value of
agency's views in discerning legislative intent when the agency has played a significant role in drafting
legislation); cf Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) ("[A]gency interpretations
that are of long standing come before us with a certain credential of reasonableness, since it is rare that
error would long persist. But neither antiquity nor contemporaneity with the statute is a condition of
validity. We accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not because of a presumption that they
drafted the provisions in question, or were present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but
rather because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementa-
tion by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency,
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.").
235 See Healy, supra note 234, at 583-84 (discussing how agency's and legal community's under-
standing of the meaning of a statute is important evidence about the meaning of the statute). But cf
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("I do not believe .. . that
'particular deference' is owed 'to an agency interpretation of "longstanding" duration.' That notion is an
anachronism-a relic of the pre-Chevron days, when there was thought to be only one 'correct' interpre-
tation of a statutory text. A 'longstanding' agency interpretation, particularly one that dated back to the
very origins of the statute, was more likely to reflect the single correct meaning. But once it is accepted,
as it was in Chevron, that there is a range of permissible interpretations, and that the agency is free to
move from one to another, so long as the most recent interpretation is reasonable its antiquity should
make no difference." (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 220 (majority opinion))).
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was correct in discerning the legal rule clearly defined by the statute.236 If,
on the other hand, the agency has been inconsistent in how it has interpreted
the legal rule defined by Congress in the statute, that inconsistency may be
viewed by the court as evidence that the statute has no clear meaning or
intent (and is accordingly ambiguous).237
Experience with judicial application of step one of the Chevron analy-
sis shows that judges have become increasingly adept at finding clarity in a
statute's text, 238 structure, or intent,239 especially when a court is aided by
the canons of construction.2'40 In particular, the Supreme Court's use of clear
statement rules has had the effect of making facially ambiguous statutes
236 See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 615-16 ("[A]n agency interpretation may be per-
missible for two reasons: because it precisely maps a singular congressional intent on the issue at hand,
or because it constitutes an agency policy determination that falls within the scope of agency discretion
that is accorded by statutory ambiguity. The first of these reasons is of lesser interest in our judgment,
given the rarity of point judgments by Congress, particularly in the context of administrative law. One
may note, however, that in this context, the interpretation is properly the responsibility of judicial judg-
ment, perhaps informed by agency views but nonetheless independent.").
237 See Healy, supra note 234, at 583-84; cf Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739 ("In light of the two dissents
from the opinion of the Supreme Court of California, and in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey creating the conflict that has prompted us to take this case, it would be difficult indeed to
contend that the word 'interest' in the National Bank Act is unambiguous with regard to the point at
issue here." (footnote and citation omitted)).
238 See Elliott, supra note 2, at 2 ("Chevron is not the only trend that occurred in statutory con-
struction over the last three decades. There has also been a pronounced rise in textualism, perhaps fueled
at least in part by the first step of the Chevron analysis." (footnote omitted)).
239 See Bamberger, supra note 2, at 76 ("Chevron states that courts should utilize the 'traditional
tools' for the construction of statutes when discerning, at step one, whether Congress actually spoke to
the issue at hand. Inquiries into the statute's text, structure, and purpose, as well as traditional textual
construction canons, fit well within that step's positive inquiry, and their continued application to regu-
latory statutes is uncontroversial." (footnote omitted)).
240 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Court first
implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever,
'[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,' they are able to reach a conclusion as to the
proper interpretation of the statute. But this approach would make deference a doctrine of desperation,
authorizing courts to defer only if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue.
This is not an interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting id. at 446 (majority opinion))); Bamberger, supra note 2, at 122 ("At present, courts possess
significant leeway to manipulate canons to reach desired substantive ends. Indeed, the variability with
which canons are applied-and the unpredictability as to whether they will be applied at all-has ren-
dered courts vulnerable to criticism from both sides of the political spectrum."); cf Global Crossing
Telecomms., Inc., v. Metrophones Telecomms., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 77-78 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("The majority suggests that deference under [Chevron] compels its conclusion that a carrier's refusal to
pay a payphone operator is unreasonable. But 'unjust or unreasonable' is a statutory term, § 201(b), and
a court may not, in the name of deference, abdicate its responsibility to interpret a statute. Under Che-
vron, an agency is due no deference until the court analyzes the statute and determines that Congress did
not speak directly to the issue under consideration . . . .").
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insufficient to authorize some administrative actions.24' When a clear state-
ment rule applies, the Court has held that Congress must have provided an
agency with clear authority to take administrative action or the agency's
exercise of regulatory authority will be viewed as contrary to the law de-
fined by Congress.242
Key to understanding this step 1 analysis is that a statute may be am-
biguous in some, perhaps many respects, even though it may be clear in
precluding the agency's interpretation of the statute.243 As we have seen,244
241 Sunstein, supra note 2, at 244 (discussing Court's "discretion-denying decisions," in which the
Court concluded that Congress had not clearly granted agency authority to decide "major questions":
"They do not say that courts, rather than agencies, will interpret ambiguities. They announce, far more
ambitiously, that ambiguities will be construed so as to reduce the authority of regulatory agen-
cies.... Agencies would not receive deference when they attempt to exercise their authority in ways
that produce large-scale changes in the structure of the statutory programs that they are administering");
id. at 248-49 ("[F]uture courts should downplay the Court's unnecessary emphasis on what Congress
could not have meant to delegate. That emphasis threatens to give courts a kind of interpretive primacy
with respect to the very questions for which the Chevron framework is best suited."); see also Morales-
Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 500 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Ultimate-
ly, 'the judiciary is the final authority' in interpreting statutes, and courts must employ all 'traditional
tools of statutory construction' under Chevron step one to ascertain whether Congress's intent is 'clear.'
In this case, the text and structure of the INA are clear ... . But even if the statute were ambiguous, the
Attorney General's interpretation would be precluded by the canon of constitutional avoidance . . .
pursuant to which we must presume that Congress did not intend to permit any interpretation that, like
the Attorney General's, raises serious constitutional questions." (citation omitted) (quoting Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))); Bamberger, supra note 2,
at 92 ("Clear statement rules, then, may permit expansive interpretive authority to diverge from existing
indicia of legislative will in service of judicial restraint."); Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation
Redux: Mead and the Shrinking Domain ofStatutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 673, 682-86 (2002).
242 In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, the
Court held that the Clean Water Act did not permit the agency's exercise of regulatory authority over
isolated wetlands, because the statute failed to clearly authorize that authority, the exercise of which
raised constitutional questions:
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result. This requirement
stems from our prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our as-
sumption that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a sta-
tute to push the limit of congressional authority. This concern is heightened where the ad-
ministrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal en-
croachment upon a traditional state power. Thus, "where an otherwise acceptable construc-
tion of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the sta-
tute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Con-
gress."
531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (citations omitted) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)). For a discussion of the Court's use of clear
statement rules in the administrative context, see generally Michael P. Healy, Textualism's Limits on the
Administrative State: Of Isolated Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron, 31 ENvrtL. L. REP. 10,928
(2001).
243 See Cuomo v. The Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2715 (2009) ("There is
necessarily some ambiguity as to the meaning of the statutory term 'visitorial powers' . . . . The
Comptroller can give authoritative meaning to the statute within the bounds of that uncertainty. But the
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the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in this understanding of step 1
analysis: in Oregon, the Court concluded initially that the statute was ambi-
guous and then later effectively decided that the statute clearly barred the
agency's interpretation.245 In such a case, the agency interpretation should
be rejected at step 1 of the analysis. Indeed, a statute will rarely be unambi-
guous in all respects.2" The implication of this nature of statutes is that,
even though a court has found a statute to be ambiguous in some respects,
an agency interpretation may nevertheless be foreclosed by step 1 analy-
sis.247 Because of this characteristic of statutes, a court may prematurely
determine that a statute*is ambiguous and treat as traditional Chevron step-
two analysis what ought to be step 1 analysis.248
presence of some uncertainty does not expand Chevron deference to cover virtually any interpretation of
the National Bank Act. We can discern the outer limits of the term 'visitorial powers' even through the
clouded lens of history. They do not include, as the Comptroller's expansive regulation would provide,
ordinary enforcement of the law."); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448 ("There is obviously some
ambiguity in a term like 'well-founded fear' which can only be given concrete meaning through a
process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling 'any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress,' the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the
responsibility for administering the statutory program. But our task today is much narrower, and is well
within the province of the Judiciary. We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the
'well-founded fear' test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the
BIA were incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical." (footnote and citation omitted)
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)); cf Levin, supra note 3, at 1283 ("Chevron ... declares that the
court should initially focus its attention on whether Congress has 'directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue.' That language, however, gives reviewing courts quite a bit of latitude in determining what
the 'precise question' in a given case really is. . . . [I]f an opinion writer frames the 'precise question at
issue' as being whether Congress has clearly ruled out an option the agency has chosen, or a premise on
which the agency has sought to act, the stage may be set for reversal at step one." (footnote omitted)
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)).
244 See supra Part II.B.
245 See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
246 See Bamberger, supra note 2, at 70-71 ("Even strong defenders of interpretive fidelity to legis-
lative instructions, then, recognize that beneath a description of statutory construction as the vindication
of legislative choices lies the reality that statutory ambiguity will always leave discretion in the hands of
those assigned the interpretive task."); cf Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 615-16 (stating that
there is a "rarity of point judgments by Congress, particularly in the context of administrative law").
247 Cf Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 600-02 (arguing that Chevron analysis fundamen-
tally involves a court defining the "Range of Permissible Interpretations ('Zone of Ambiguity')" and
determining whether the agency interpretation is within that zone).
248 See Levin, supra note 3, at 1284 ("[S]o long as the issue at hand is whether an element of the
agency's argument conflicts in some way with the unambiguous intentions ofthe legislature, the court's
inquiry should not be fragmented into two discrete steps. It should be resolved in a unified fashion at
step one."). For additional examples of the Court treating as traditional Chevron step-two analysis what
should properly have been step-one analysis, see Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metro-
phones Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 55 (2007), AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366,
388-92 (1999), and Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996).
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When a court reaches the conclusion of its step 1 analysis, it should
find either clear statutory meaning or relevant statutory ambiguity, 249 be-
cause the statute does not bar the agency's substantive interpretation.250
B. Step 2: The Mead Analysis25 1
After the court has determined that the statute is ambiguous regarding
the legal issue resolved by the agency, the court must identify the review
regime that applies to the agency determination. This is the Mead analysis,
which implements the principle that a court must accept an agency's rea-
sonable exercise of delegated lawmaking power, because Congress intends
such judicial deference. 252
249 See Bamberger, supra note 2, at 74 ("At step one of the analysis, then, judges should use 'tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction' to ascertain 'whether Congress has directly spoken' on an issue."
(quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9 (1984))).
250 In reaching this interpretive conclusion, the court is exercising the "decider" function described
by Professor Strauss. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 618 ("[F]udging language permits a
court to uphold an agency's construction and even to suggest that it constitutes the 'best' interpretation
of statutory language, without any prior determination as to whether it is acting in its 'decider' role
regarding the bounds of agency discretion or is simply acting as an overseer of a judgment committed to
agency decision. The regrettable consequence is to obscure whether the court's construction binds
further agency decisionmaking conclusively or leaves future decisionmaking to agency interpretive
authority."). A court's decision at this step of the analysis has gained importance because the Court has
held in Brand X that a judicial determination of clear statutory meaning is binding on and may not be
superseded by an agency in the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority. See supra notes 147-51; see
also Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 620 ("So while judicial bounding of agency discretion has
precedential value, any judicial judgment on a question within that discretionary area-that may be
required because the agency has not yet definitively acted-does not. Such a reality suggests that doctrine
should be clarified, if at all, to strengthen Chevron's indication that interpreting courts must address the
existence of ambiguity first as a means for ensuring recognition of the appropriate judicial role, rather
than to orient judicial decisionmaking towards a touchstone of interpretive reasonableness." (footnote
omitted)); cf Levin, supra note 3, at 1290 ("[Tlhe court must decide how far it will express its views 'as
a matter of law' on the substantive issues in the case, and how far it will, instead, treat the issues as a
matter of discretion and consider whether the agency used that discretion rationally. The court has to
draw this line regardless of whether it prefers to characterize its 'interpretive' role as a step one or step
two exercise. The line it draws has real-world significance, because to the extent that the court expresses
its position in 'legal' terms, the agency would have much more difficulty departing from that position
afterwards.").
251 See supra Part I.F (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Mead).
252 Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173-74 (2007) ("[T]he ultimate ques-
tion is whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat an agency's rule, regulation,
application of a statute, or other agency action as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of 'gap-
filling' authority. Where an agency rule sets forth important individual rights and duties, where the
agency focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses full notice-and-comment proce-
dures to promulgate a rule, where the resulting rule falls within the statutory grant of authority, and
where the rule itself is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to defer to
the agency's determination.").
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The key judicial determination yielded by this step is the identification
of the source of the law that the court is reviewing. That source is either the
agency itself, when the agency has exercised lawmaking power delegated to
it by Congress, or Congress, when the agency has simply decided what it
believes the ambiguous statute means in the particular setting for the agen-
cy's decision. Mead253 established, and cases like Oregon2" and Brand X"
confirmed, that there are two requirements for an agency to be seen as the
source of lawmaking power: Congress must have delegated lawmaking
power to the agency and the agency must actually have exercised that dele-
gated lawmaking power. The agency must have been able to make law and
must have intended to make law.256 In the absence of an agency properly
making law, Congress itself is the source of the law.257
The Mead analysis is conducted at this stage of review, rather than
prior to step one.258 If the agency's interpretation conflicts with clearly de-
fined statutory law, the focus of the step-one analysis, the judicial review
process, is at an end because Congress has defined clear law.259 Moreover,
the issue of whether a statute clearly defines the applicable law has new
importance after the Court's decision in Brand X. Brand X held that an
agency continues to have discretion to exercise lawmaking power delegated
by Congress even after a court interprets the meaning of an ambiguous sta-
tute.2" If, however, the statute is determined to be unambiguous at step 1,
the agency has no power to define the law.261
253 See supra Part IF.
254 See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
255 See supra Part I.G.
256 See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (according Skidmore deference to agency's
view that its regulations preempt state law because "[w]hile agencies have no special authority to pro-
nounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress, they do have a unique understanding of the
statutes they administer and an attendant ability to make informed determinations about how state re-
quirements may pose an 'obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress' (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
257 As discussed supra Part IIA, Justice Scalia ignored this consideration in his dissent in Massa-
chusetts, where he relied on Chevron deference even though the agency believed it was following Con-
gress's dictates, rather than itself making law. In Negusie, also discussed supra Part IIA, the Court
failed to connect this analysis of the agency's interpretation of a statute to the Mead analysis.
258 Professor Sunstein discussed Mead review in his article entitled, Chevron Step Zero. See Suns-
tein, supra note 2, at 213-16. Professor Sunstein did not discuss the proper locus of the Mead analysis.
He appeared to locate it at step zero because the analysis determines the applicability of Chevron defe-
rence. Such deference is applicable, however, only after a court concludes that the statute itself does not
preclude the agency interpretation-the traditional Chevron step-one analysis. The Mead analysis
should therefore be pursued only after the step-one analysis has been completed, rather than before it.
259 The order of the Court's analysis was accordingly proper in Massachusetts and Oregon, see
supra Part IIA, but was not proper in Brand X, where the Court engaged in the Mead analysis prior to
the step-one analysis, see supra Part I.G.
260 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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An exception to this view of the proper order of the steps comprising
judicial review is present when a court has previously interpreted the rele-
vant part of the statute. In this circumstance, conducting the step 2 analysis
prior to the step I analysis will avoid unnecessary judicial decisionmaking
if the court concludes that the agency has not acted in the exercise of dele-
gated lawmaking power. In this circumstance, the prior judicial interpreta-
tion would bind the agency, regardless of whether the statute is clear.
A related issue is whether a court should, if the court agrees that the
agency interpretation is a proper interpretation of the statute, forego the
Mead analysis and assume for purposes of the decision the less deferential
Skidmore review standard. Indeed, courts have decided to avoid the Mead
analysis in "many cases." 26 2 A reviewing court might find this to be an at-
tractive option because the Mead analysis is often uncertain. 263 The problem
262 Bressman, supra note 7, at 1464-65 ("In many cases, the courts express their uncertainty about
Mead by refraining from deciding clearly whether Chevron deference applies. Instead, they find an
easier way out. Some refuse to choose between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference and simply
determine that lower-level Skidmore deference supports the agency's interpretation. Others refuse to
choose and simply determine that both Chevron deference and Skidmore deference support the agency's
interpretation." (footnote omitted)); see also Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council,
129 S. Ct. 2458, 2479-80 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("Mead['s] ... incomprehensible criteria
for Chevron deference have produced so much confusion in the lower courts that there has now ap-
peared the phenomenon of Chevron avoidance-the practice of declining to opine whether Chevron
applies or not." (footnote omitted)); Bressman, supra note 7, at 1469 ("[L]ower courts have not made
progress toward answering the question when an interpretation generated through an informal procedure
is entitled to Chevron deference because they have chosen to avoid the question."); cf Sunstein, supra
note 2, at 229 ("For most cases, the choice between Chevron and Skidmore is not material, and hence it
is not worthwhile to worry over it."). For examples of cases in which the court declines to engage in the
Mead analysis, see PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 438 F.3d
1184, 1197-98 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and Springfield, Inc. v. Buckles, 292 F.3d 813, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
263 We know that informal, and no doubt formal, rulemaking, as well as formal adjudication, in-
volves the exercise of lawmaking power (assuming that Congress has delegated such power to the
agency). See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) ("[T]he overwhelming number of
our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or
formal adjudication."). Whether an informal adjudication has involved agency lawmaking is less clear.
See Bressman, supra note 7, at 1445 ("[C]ourts adopt inconsistent approaches to the issue of Chevron
deference when an agency does not use notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. With-
out fully recognizing their differences, courts vacillate from one set of considerations to another to
determine whether an agency has issued an interpretation with the force of law." (footnote omitted)); id.
at 1458-59 ("After Mead, courts diverge as to what evidence demonstrates that Congress intended an
agency to issue an interpretation with the force of law and that the agency exercised its authority to do
so.... [S]ome courts concentrate on whether an interpretation binds more than the parties at hand; some
broaden this analysis to ask whether, in addition to binding effect, the interpretation reflects public
participation; some limit their focus to whether an agency interpretation reflects careful consideration;
and some expand this focus, weighing careful consideration along with agency expertise and statutory
complexity." (footnote omitted)). Because of this uncertainty, a court may wish to avoid the analysis.
See, e.g., Tripoli Rocketry Ass'n, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms, 337 F. Supp. 2d
1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2004) (applying both Chevron and Skidmore regimes to review of regulation); Biodiver-
sity Legal Found. v. Norton, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2003) (declining to decide on applicability of
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with this approach is that, by avoiding the Mead analysis, the court fails to
identify the source of the law being reviewed by the court. On the other
hand, the agency would retain the authority to change the legal interpreta-
tion in the exercise of delegated lawmaking power, assuming Congress had
delegated that authority, because the court would not have held the statute
to be unambiguous. 26
The Mead analysis must, in any event, be completed prior to the next
step in the analysis, because the outcome of the Mead analysis determines
the nature of further review of the agency decision. Further review is, of
course, necessary because the statute has been determined to be ambiguous
(at step 1). That further review moves in one of two importantly different
directions based on the outcome of the Mead analysis. 265
C. Step 3(A): Arbitrary or Capricious Review ofAgency Exercise of
Delegated Lawmaking Power When Statute Is Ambiguous
This is the point of the judicial review process at which the path of de-
cisionmaking splits. Assume that the court has decided both that the statute
does not substantively foreclose the agency's interpretation 2' and that the
agency has acted in the exercise of lawmaking power that Congress has
delegated to the agency.267 This is the context in which, using the traditional.
nomenclature, the court accords Chevron step-two deference to the agency
legal determination. This nomenclature is, at best, misleading:268 the court
will instead, at this step 3(A), engage solely in arbitrary or capricious re-
view of the agency determination. 269
Chevron deference because agency decision was lawful applying Skidmore deference). Consideration of
the body of law that determines the applicability of the Chevron regime is beyond the scope of this
Article.
264 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005).
265 The Mead analysis determines whether the Chevron regime or the Skidmore regime applies to
review of the agency decision. See supra Part I.F.
266 See supra Part Ill.A (step 1).
267 See supra Part II1.B (step 2).
268 Cf Levin, supra note 3, at 1295 ("After more than a dozen years, the second step in the Che-
vron standard of review remains ill-defined. Undoubtedly a major part of the explanation for this hazi-
ness is that . . . the internal logic of the Chevron formula made it directly relevant to judicial review of
exercises of administrative discretion . . . . The sweep of the Chevron test has made it difficult to im-
plement, because the Court made no serious effort to integrate its two-step formula with the arbitrariness
standard of the APA, which covers much of the same territory."); id at 1261 ("Chevron left the very
meaning of the second step ill-defined; further clarification was going to be necessary.").
269 The approach described by the text is consistent with the approach advocated by Justice Scalia
in his concurrence in Negusie. See supra notes 201-02 (stating that a permissible agency interpretation
under Chevron step one must nevertheless be reached through a reasonable decisionmaking process).
The Court, however, focused on the substance, rather than the process, of the agency's decision under
step two of Chevron in Brand X. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. Most recently, the
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Step 1 of the analysis has already determined that the statute is ambi-
guous with respect to the agency's substantive legal decision. This decision
is equivalent to holding that the agency has discretion under the statute to
reach its substantive decision (because it is not barred by the statute).
Moreover, step 2 of the analysis has, we have assumed, yielded a conclu-
sion that the agency has been delegated by Congress and has exercised
lawmaking authority with regard to the determination being challenged.
The remaining issue relating to the legality of the agency position is, there-
fore, whether the agency has properly exercised its discretion: the proper
exercise of discretion is the subject of arbitrary or capricious review. 270 This
step 3(A) review is quite different from the step I review. At step 1, the
court is inquiring into statutory meaning, a substantive determination, while
the step 3(A) inquiry reviews reasonable implementation of an ambiguous
statute, which constitutes a review of decisionmaking process.27 1
This understanding of Chevron step-two review has been recognized
on occasion by the Supreme Court,272 as well as by prominent legal com-
Court in Mayo Foundation was ambiguous regarding the focus of its Chevron step-two analysis. See
supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
270 See Levin, supra note 3, at 1260-61 ("Under the structure of the Chevron formula, a court
should not reach step two unless it has already found during step one that the statute supports the gov-
ernment's interpretation or at least is ambiguous with respect to it. In other words, the agency's view is
not clearly contrary to the meaning of the statute. If the court has made such a finding, one would think
that the government's interpretation must be at least 'reasonable' in the court's eyes."); Strauss, supra
note 12, at 823 ("The 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion' formula applies not only to factual
matters, but to all the stuff that lives in between fact and law-to judgments about law application,
exercises of discretion, and so forth.").
271 See Levin, supra note 3, at 1270 (discussing how, after the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit "had resolved to make consistent use of Chevron as the focus of its review of the
substance of agency actions, it had to find a role for the second Chevron step that would set it apart from
the work of the first step. The use of abuse of discretion arguments at step two has alleviated the prob-
lem. . . . [SItep one asks whether the agency violated a clear mandate in the statute itself, and step two
asks whether the agency used acceptable reasoning to get from the statute to its ultimate result.");
Strauss, supra note 12, at 826 ("The Chevron step two issue is whether the agency's judgment, on a
matter within what the reviewing court has found to be the agency's delegated authority, is a 'reasona-
ble' judgment. That is to say, in APA terms, it is a matter respecting which the court's responsibility is
to say whether it is 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion."' (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted)); cf Elliott, supra note 2, at 8 ("This second step of the Chevron Two-Step is subject only to
the weak judicial check that the agency's decision must be 'reasonable,' a standard that applies anyway
to virtually all aspects of administrative decisions that are subject to judicial review."). But cf Bamberg-
er, supra note 2, at 111, 117 (contending that courts should engage in review at Chevron step two that
accounts for normative canons and reviews the agency's substantive view).
272 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S.
Ct. 1159, 1171 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[O]ur opinion [in Che-
vron] reaffirmed both that '[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction,' and
that courts should defer to an agency's reasonable formulation of policy in response to an explicit or
implicit congressional delegation of authority. The Chevron framework thus accounts for the different
institutional competencies of agencies and courts: Courts are expert at statutory construction, while
agencies are expert at statutory implementation. That the distinction can be subtle does not lessen its
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mentators.273 This understanding of the proper review regime yields two
important effects. The first effect is that the court does not review the sub-
importance." (third alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))); id at 1171 n.] ("[In Chevron,] the EPA argued
that its regulation defining 'stationary source' as an entire plant was permissible under the Clean Air
Act, but the agency treated its rulemaking as a matter of fashioning sound policy, not of discerning the
meaning of 'stationary source' in the statute."); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696
(1991) ("As Chevron itself illustrates, the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a
question of policy than of law."). But see, e.g., Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 173-
76 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (engaging in substantive Chevron step-two review, after concluding that the statute
was ambiguous).
273 See Bamberger, supra note 2, at 114 ("For a growing consensus of prominent administrative
law scholars, courts' role at step two should be conceived principally as procedural, and the reasonable-
ness inquiry akin to that provided under the Administrative Procedure Act's prohibition against policy-
making that is 'arbitrary and capricious."'); Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 623-24 ("Step Two
analysis considers whether agencies have permissibly exercised the interpretive authority delegated to
them by reasonably employing appropriate methods for elaborating statutory meaning. Such review,
albeit not the type of 'hard look' review conventionally associated with State Farm, fits comfortably
within the framework of Section 706(2)(A). These questions lend themselves to consideration within the
Chevron framework because their answers implicate the resolution of statutory ambiguity, the appropri-
ate scope of agency discretion in light of the governing statute's meaning, and the boundary between the
judicial decision and judicial oversight functions. Yet when their determination involves judicial over-
sight of agency choices rather than independent judicial judgment, the outcomes should not fix statutory
meaning but rather leave a range of interpretive authority in agency hands. This is Chevron's Step
Two."); Levin, supra note 3, at 1254-55 ("If the courts would define the scope of the Chevron step one
inquiry and of arbitrariness review as broadly as they should, there would be no need for a separate and
distinct Chevron step two, and that test could simply be absorbed into arbitrariness review. If this notion
were generally accepted, analysis of merits issues during judicial review could immediately become less
complicated, without any necessary alteration in the substance of the court's tasks. At the same time,
this solution would make application of Chevron step two more administrable, because courts and
litigants could look directly to the vast body of case law and commentary on abuse of discretion review
as a guide to the meaning of that aspect of the Chevron standard."); see also Bamberger & Strauss,
supra note 3, at 621 ("Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus that the
'arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion' standard set forth in Section 706(2)(A) supplies the
metric for judicial oversight at Chevron's second step."). This is the court's oversight role, as contrasted
with the decider role, which is described by Professors Bamberger and Strauss. See Bamberger &
Strauss, supra note 3, at 625 ("Once courts determine, however, that the existence of ambiguity has
placed primary authority for a matter in agency hands and that the scope of that ambiguity permits the
agency choice, the judicial role moves from decision to oversight, and thus to Chevron's second step. At
this step, Section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act sets the general standard, and courts
inquire as to whether the agency's judgment on a matter within its delegated authority is 'reasonable.'
While the statutory language defining that inquiry is the same language that governed State Farm, the
emphasis may vary. The focus may be on interpretive method, as opposed to the fact-intensive judg-
ments at issue in State Farm." (footnote omitted)); Elliott, supra note 2, at 12 ("Because of the nature of
the 'Chevron deference' that courts now give to agencies, the answer is usually that whether an agency's
interpretation of its authority will be upheld depends on how strong its reasons are; it depends on what
justifications the agency would be able to give for a policy. In other words, whether a court will uphold
an agency's interpretation of its authority depends on contingent, consequentialist justifications. It
depends on what one can write into a preamble justifying an interpretation in terms of factual support
and policy justifications.").
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stance of the agency's lawmaking interpretation beyond the decision (al-
ready made at step 1) that the interpretation is not clearly foreclosed by the
statute. 274 The second effect is that the Chevron deference nomenclature
amounts to a misnomer, because the Chevron theory's actual effect in-
volves the reviewing of an agency's permissible lawmaking only to deter-
mine whether the agency's decisionmaking process was "arbitrary or capri-
cious. "275 When properly understood, the effect of the Chevron regime is
accordingly to remove courts altogether from the substantive interpretation
of ambiguous statutes when the agency has engaged in delegated lawmak-
ing. The other, earlier component of Chevron analysis (step 1) withdraws
the agency from the statute-focused aspect of the case, except to the extent
the agency's conduct provides the court with a reason for concluding that
the statute has a particular clear meaning or intent.276
The nature of how agency lawmaking is reviewed, if not substantively
foreclosed by the statute, is also compatible with the structure of APA stan-
dards of review.277 The court has decided by this point (through the step 1
analysis) that the agency has not acted beyond its statutory authority, as
reviewed under section 706(2)(C) of the APA. 278 The remaining question is
whether the agency's lawmaking process was reasonable, which is re-
viewed under the arbitrary or capricious standard defined by section
706(2)(A).279
274 Some courts have designated such review as Chevron step-two review. See supra Part II.C. This
Article has discussed why such decisions are properly understood as step-one decisions. See supra notes
258-59 and accompanying text.
275 This review is affected by the statute at issue, because the statute determines the factors that are
relevant to the agency's exercise of discretion. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text. Professor
Levin has written that:
[A]rbitrariness review in administrative law has always overlapped statutory construction to
some extent. Issues that, analytically speaking, might be better seen as questions of law (de-
termining how much authority an agency had) are allowed to shade into questions of discre-
tion (determining whether the agency misused its authority). Some of our leading precedents
defining abuse of discretion review confirm this overlap: Under Overton Park abuse of dis-
cretion review asks in part whether the agency considered the "relevant factors," and under
State Farm one consideration bearing on whether a rule is arbitrary and capricious is whether
the agency "has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider."
Levin, supra note 3, at 1285-86 (footnote omitted) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), and Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29,43 (1983)).
276 See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
277 Part V of this Article reorganizes the Article's proposed structure of judicial review by refer-
ence to the APA. See infra Part V.
278 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006).
279 Id. § 706(2)(A); see also Levin, supra note 3, at 1267 ("[C]ourts have for many years been
accustomed to reviewing legislative regulations through a two-step process in which the judge would
initially ask whether the agency had stayed within the bounds of its delegated discretion (in Chevron's
terms, was the agency's view 'manifestly contrary to the statute'?), and then whether the agency had
abused its discretion. One of Chevron's most important innovations was to extend this model to agen-
cies' statutory interpretations generally."); Strauss, supra note 12, at 826 ("Chevron step two and State
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In sum, the arbitrary or capricious review undertaken at step 3(A) eva-
luates whether a legal determination that is substantively permissible under
the statute is nevertheless unlawful because the decision was made in an
improper manner. The proper focus is on the agency decisionmaking
process, not the substance of the decision itself, which has previously been
found to be permissible as a substantive matter.280 At the conclusion of the
step 3(A) process, a court should either uphold the agency interpretation or
remand to the agency for reconsideration.
D. Step 3(B)(1): Court's Provisional Determination of Meaning of an
Ambiguous Statute Accounting for Skidmore Deference28'
The step 3(B)(1) analysis identifies the alternate route of review for a
court, based on the result of the step 2 (Mead) analysis. 28 2 If the reviewing
court, having applied the Mead analysis, determines that the agency did not
act to make law based on the delegation of lawmaking authority to the
agency, the court itself must determine a substantive meaning of the ambi-
guous statute, using Skidmore deference. Step 3(B)(1) is accordingly the
second of the two decisional paths that diverge based on the outcome of the
Mead analysis. 283
This step of the review requires the court to make its best judgment
about the substantive meaning of the ambiguous statute enacted by Con-
gress. Accordingly, this review is sharply different from the decisionmak-
mg process review engaged in at step 3(A). 28 In reaching its judgment
about the substance of the law enacted by Congress, the court may be aided
Farm issues are both decided under APA § 706(2)(A). The Chevron step two issue is whether the agen-
cy's judgment, on a matter within what the reviewing court has found to be the agency's delegated
authority, is a 'reasonable' judgment. That is to say, in APA terms, it is a matter respecting which the
court's responsibility is to say whether it is 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.' This is the
identical language as underlay State Farm.. .. How one assesses what is 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] an
abuse of discretion' does vary with context. Still, 'President Clinton demanded it' will not count as a
'reasonable' basis for action under § 706(2)(A) unless the statute makes that a dispositive factor; the
agency must have reasons that satisfy its statutory charge." (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted)
(footnotes omitted)).
280 See Catawba Cnty., N.C. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (accepting
legal permissibility of agency's "nine-factor test," but recognizing that agency acted unlawfully if test
had been applied "inconsistently, resulting in similar counties being treated dissimilarly" or "applied ...
so erroneously in a particular case that it could not have reasonably concluded that a county was contri-
buting to nearby violations").
281 The text employs the common expression of Skidmore deference, even though that expression
is a misnomer. A more accurate expression would be Skidmore guidance or Skidmore persuasion. See
supra note 61.
282 Step 2 analysis is discussed supra Part III.B.
283 The other route was step 3(A), discussed supra Part III.C.
284 See supra Part III.C.
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by the agency's experience and expertise to the extent that the court finds
them to be helpful and persuasive. 285 The nature of this judicial determina-
tion is, however, at the core of the judiciary's law-determining function.286
The Supreme Court's decision in Oregon is an example of a substantive
judicial interpretation employing Skidmore deference.2 87
A court fails to conform to its proper role if it fails to make its own in-
dependent judgment about the substance of the congressional enactment
and instead simply accepts the agency's substantive view of the law 288 or
focuses on the adequacy of the agency's decisionmaking process rather than
285 This is the core of Skidmore deference: the court is interpreting the statute, with the agency
offering assistance in understanding what the statute provides. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying
text; see also Bressman, supra note 7, at 1446 ("While Chevron deference means that an agency, not a
court, exercises interpretive control, Skidmore deference means just the opposite."); cf.Wyeth v. Levine,
129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) ("While agencies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption
absent delegation by Congress, they do have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer and
an attendant ability to make informed determinations about how state requirements may pose an 'ob-
stacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
286 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is."). By employing the Skidmore review
regime, the court necessarily exercises greater lawmaking power that arises from the court, rather than
an agency, having the authority to interpret the statute. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
(1987) ("The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be identical is a pure question of
statutory construction for the courts to decide."); cf Bressman, supra note 7, at 1449 ("Justice Scalia's
proposal [for broad application of Chevron deference] also has a larger theoretical advantage. It pro-
motes political accountability of agency action. It removes from judicial control and remits to presiden-
tial control all authoritative agency interpretations, not just those rendered through certain procedures.").
287 See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text. Because the Court concluded that the Attorney
General lacked the delegated authority to promulgate regulations barring doctors from prescribing
prescription drugs for use in physician assisted suicide, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258
(2006), the agency would lack authority to promulgate a new and different rule, see National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005). For another
example of a court employing the Skidmore regime to interpret a statute, see Landmark Legal Founda-
tion v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Chevron being inapplicable here in light of Mead,
we must decide for ourselves the best reading of the modifying clause .... We conclude that indeed the
statutory phrase-'the existence, or possible existence, of liability'-naturally encompasses the issue of
tax-exemption vel non.").
288 For examples of courts failing to play the properjudicial role in the Skidmore regime, see Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. FDIC, 310 F.3d 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating "doubt" about the applicabil-
ity of Chevron deference and holding ambiguously that the agency interpretation "is a reasonable-if
not the most reasonable-interpretation of the statute."), Assn of Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. United
States, 601 F. Supp. 2d 146, 163-64 (D.D.C. 2009) (indecisively regarding the applicable review regime
and appearing to rely on the agency's interpretation based on its view that "Congress has not specifically
spoken on a particular question, and Congress has generally delegated to the agency the power to admi-
nister the statute and to make decisions carrying the force of law."), affid, 603 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir.
2010), and Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Norton, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining
that "the Court need not delve into" applicable review standard because the agency interpretation was
lawful "even under the less-deferential Skidmore analysis or the Court's own determination").
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the statute itself.289 At this point a court has already determined that the
agency did not exercise delegated lawmaking power, so the only law is the
law that Congress itself defined in the statute; the court is responsible for
determining the content of that law.
To be sure, the legal stakes of the court's statutory decision are re-
duced because the court may be determining only the provisional meaning
of the statute (under Brand X).2 The court-determined meaning, however,
is provisional only if the agency does, in fact, have lawmaking authority
that the agency may exercise at a later time and, thereby, supersede the
court's legal interpretation.
Step 3(B)(1) thus further clarifies that the impact of so-called Chevron
deference is actually to avoid entirely a court's interpretation of an ambi-
guous statute and, rather, to proceed directly to arbitrary or capricious re-
view, the step 3(A) described above. When an agency has met the threshold
requirements for so-called Chevron deference, a court is precluded from
engaging in an independent interpretation of the substantive meaning of an
ambiguous statute. For litigants who are challenging agency action, the
benefit of this step 3(B)(1) review is that the party has the chance to con-
vince a court of its preferred substantive interpretation of the ambiguous
statute.291 The incentive for agencies, of course, moves in the opposite di-
rection. If the agency wishes to avoid a court's trumping interpretation of
an ambiguous statute, it should engage in lawmaking, which is usually ac-
complished by rulemaking or formal adjudication.2 92
It is important to recognize that the Supreme Court has effectively es-
tablished an exception to the judicial determination of statutory meaning,
despite an agency's failure to engage in delegated lawmaking authority with
respect to an ambiguous statute. When an agency believes that clear statuto-
ry law binds it, the agency will decline to exercise its own lawmaking au-
thority. If a court later concludes that the statute is actually ambiguous with
respect to the legal issue, a court may not wish to impose its construction of
289 For an example of this type of flawed approach, see Brown v. United States, 327 F.3d 1198,
1205 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("Treasury's methodology for calculating locality pay increases satisfies the
requirements for Skidmore deference.").
290 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
291 An agency can then change that law only if it later acts in the exercise of delegated lawmaking
power.
292 See Stephenson, supra note 7, at 533-34 ("[C]ourts defer more to formal agency decisions than
to informal decisions because procedural formality is a proxy for other things that courts care about,
thereby rendering textual plausibility relatively less important."); cf id. at 533 ("Increasing the weight
the court attaches to agency policy views causes agencies to use formal procedures more frequently and
for relatively less important issues."). Such administrative procedures do, however, impose costs on the
agency. See id at 546 ("[F]ormal procedures are more costly for the agency. The costs associated with
procedural formality include delay, staff time, money, and perhaps more intensive scrutiny from Con-
gress or other overseers. It is widely believed that these procedural costs are substantial and that they are
often a significant consideration in agency decisionmaking." (footnote omitted)).
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the ambiguous statute on the agency. 293 This judicial restraint conforms to
the Chenery I principle, because it permits the agency to deploy its exper-
tise and experience in interpreting the statute with the benefit of the judicial
elaboration of the statute's ambiguity. 2' Despite the understandable allure
of the Chenery I principle, the importance of an initial legal determination
by the agency, rather than the court, is reduced as a consequence of the
Court's decision in Brand X that a court's interpretation of an ambiguous
statute is only provisional and may be superseded by the agency's later ex-
ercise of its delegated lawmaking power.
In sum, step 3(B)(1), when it is applicable, requires the court itself to
discern the substantive meaning of an ambiguous statute, according Skid-
more deference to the agency's interpretation. An agency avoids this subs-
tantive review when it acts to define ambiguous law by exercising lawmak-
ing power delegated by Congress.
E. Step 3(B)(2): Review of the Process of an Agency Legal Determination
that the Court Has Adopted Employing Skidmore Deference
In the event that the court decides at step 3(B)(1) of its review that the
agency was correct in its interpretation of the ambiguous statute (having
employed Skidmore deference), the court completes its review of the agen-
cy's decision by employing arbitrary or capricious review. This review en-
sures that the agency's decisionmaking process was proper. As with step
3(A), in which the court reviews the process of an agency's exercise of de-
legated lawmaking power that has been found to be substantively permissi-
ble,295 this step ensures that the process of agency interpretation was ade-
quate.296
Arbitrary or capricious review properly supplements the court's step
3(B)(1) determination that the agency's decision was not "in excess of sta-
tutory jurisdiction,"297 by ensuring that it was reached in a reasonable man-
ner.298 Arbitrary or capricious review is generally understood to be applica-
ble when an agency action is either assumed to be, (e.g., Overton Park) or
293 See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (discussing Negusie).
294 The Chenery I principle is relevant, however, only when an agency does have delegated law-
making power, because the law otherwise is only what Congress has defined (as determined by the
judiciary).
295 See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
296 This understanding of arbitrary or capricious review is consistent with the Court's understand-
ing of this review in Fox: arbitrary or capricious review does not concern itself with the substances of
the agency's decision and looks at only at the process of decisionmaking. See supra Part lI.E.
297 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006).
298 See supra notes 277-79 and accompanying text (describing by reference to Section 706 the two
ways in which an agency legal interpretation may be found unlawful).
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determined to be, within the agency's scope of statutory authority (that is,
not substantively foreclosed by the statute).
IV. INTEGRATED REVIEW AND CHANGES IN AN AGENCY'S LEGAL
POSITION
Having described an integrated regime for the review of agency legal
interpretations, we will consider how that regime would approach review
when an agency has changed its interpretation. Changed agency interpreta-
tions have been at issue in several of the Court's foundational judicial re-
view decisions, including State Farm,2" Chevron,3" and more recently
Fox. 301
A change in an agency's legal interpretation may be accomplished in
two ways that are relevant to this discussion. The agency may change its
position in the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority, or it may change
its position as to its understanding of what the statute itself provides. In
either case, the court will determine initially whether the agency position
conflicts with the clear dictates of the statute. This decision would be de-
termined by the court's view of the law clearly defined by Congress. As-
suming that the statute is sufficiently ambiguous to permit the agency's
interpretation, the court would turn to the step 2 analysis of whether the
agency has exercised delegated lawmaking power. If the agency has exer-
cised lawmaking power, the court would turn to step 3(A) of its review and
determine whether the agency's new position, already found to be substan-
tively permissible, was determined by a lawful decisionmaking process. In
particular, a court would want to ensure that the agency came to its new
position by a consideration of factors that the statute makes relevant to the
agency's substantive determination. This is the process-based review pre-
scribed by Overton Park2 and State Farm.303 This review process is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's view that the change in agency position does
not affect the applicability of Chevron deference, but instead is evaluated
by reference to arbitrary or capricious review.
Consider, however, the alternate judicial review regime, if the agen-
cy's change in position is not undertaken in the exercise of delegated law-
299 See supra Part I.D.
300 See supra Part I.E.
301 See supra Part ll.E.
302 See supra Part I.C.
303 See supra Part I.D.
304 See Nat'1 Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)
("Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpretation under the
Chevron framework. Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be
an arbitrary or capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act."); see
also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712 (2011).
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making power. Step 1 of the review would be the same as the review in the
earlier scenario: a court would determine whether the statute clearly bars
the agency's new interpretation. If the new interpretation is not barred, the
court would determine under step 2 what was already assumed: the new
interpretation is not the result of an exercise of delegated lawmaking power.
This conclusion has the effect of moving the court to step 3(B)(1), which
requires the court itself to interpret the ambiguous statute, according Skid-
more deference to the agency's position. The fact that the agency has
changed its interpretation would mean that the new interpretation is likely
to be less persuasive to the court. Indeed, the court might find the previous
interpretation more persuasive. The court would then reach its own inde-
pendent judgment about the statute's meaning.
If the court were to reach a different conclusion about the content of
the substantive law, the agency, if it had delegated lawmaking power,
would have the ability to exercise that authority to change the judicial inter-
pretation through its own lawmaking authority, which would thereafter be
reviewed in the manner described above. If the court were to reach the same
substantive decision as the agency following the step 3(B)(1) review, the
court would review the agency decision pursuant to step 3(B)(2) to deter-
mine whether it is lawful under arbitrary or capricious review by focusing
on the agency's rationale in support of its change in position.
V. INTEGRATING REVIEW STANDARDS WITH SECTION 706 OF THE APA
Chevron is acknowledged as a foundational decision in administrative
law.30 One lingering effect of the decision is the framing of the understand-
ing of judicial review by reference to steps, as in Chevron's two-step re-
view process.30 An alternate way to define the structure of judicial review
is by reference to the standards of review defined in Section 706 of the
APA.307 That provision has two subsections that are directly relevant to the
permissibility of an agency's legal determination. The agency decision is
unlawful under Section 706(2)(C) if the decision is beyond the agency's
statutory authority. The agency decision is also unlawful if it is arbitrary or
capricious under Section 706(2)(A). 30 8 The fact that the APA has these two
305 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
306 This Article also takes a step-by-step approach. See supra Part III.
307 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
308 The Supreme Court has also employed Section 706(2)(A) to implicate the scope of the agency's
statutory authority. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2469
(2009) ("A second question remains: In issuing the permit did the Corps act in violation of a statutory
mandate so that the issuance was 'not in accordance with law'?" (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A))).
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standards would give rise to the conclusion that they are expected to have
different effects."*
The excess of statutory authority standard (Section 706(2)(C)) is fo-
cused on the statute, with the court deciding whether the statute forecloses
the agency interpretation. Under step 1, this result is present if the statute is
clear in that regard. An agency interpretation would also be foreclosed un-
der step 3(B)(1) if the court, having applied Skidmore deference, interprets
an ambiguous statute as inconsistent with the agency interpretation. After
the statute-centered question of the statutory permissibility of the agency
interpretation, the APA tasks the court with reviewing the permissibility of
the agency's decisionmaking process under arbitrary or capricious review,
an agency-centered inquiry.3"0 This review ensures that the agency, al-
though reaching a substantive interpretation that the statute does not forec-
lose, has reached the decision in a proper way. 3"
The Article now describes how the legal review regime already de-
scribed in Part III may be understood as implementing these review stan-
dards. Relating the steps of judicial review to the standards of review de-
309 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 865 (4th ed. 2007) ("Under the whole act rule, the presumption
is that every word and phrase adds something to the statutory command.").
310 In many cases, courts will proceed directly to arbitrary or capricious review, with its focus on
agency decisionmaking, without engaging in the statute focused analysis of steps 1, 2, or 3(B)(1). Such
review is applied when a statute plainly grants an agency broad discretion. For example, in Comcast
Corp. v. FCC, the plaintiff challenged an FCC regulation. Congress's delegation of rulemaking authori-
ty was quite broad:
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 directed the FCC,
"[i]n order to enhance effective competition," to "prescrib[e] rules and regulations ... [to]
ensure that no cable operator or group of cable operators can unfairly impede, either because
of the size of any individual operator or because of joint actions by a group of operators of
sufficient size, the flow of video programming from the video programmer to the consumer."
The Commission is to "make such rules and regulations reflect the dynamic nature of the
communications marketplace."
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing 47 U.S.C. §§ 533(f)(1)-(2)(A), (f)(2)(E) (2006)). There was no claim that the agency had acted
beyond its statutory authority, and the court held that the agency was arbitrary or capricious in promul-
gating a regulation that established a 30 percent market share limit on the subscribers a single cable
television operator may serve. Id. at 9-10.
311 See Eagle Broad. Grp., Ltd. v. FCC, 563 F.3d 543, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Even when an agen-
cy's construction of its statute passes muster under Chevron, a party may claim that the disputed agency
action is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' (quot-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A))). In American Equity, the court initially determined that the substance of the
agency's interpretation was permissible under steps one and two of Chevron. See Am. Equity Inv. Life
Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding that statute is ambiguous thus satisfy-
ing step One); id. at 174-76 (holding that the agency's substantive interpretation was reasonable thus
satisfying step Two). The court then concluded that the agency promulgation of the regulation was
arbitrary or capricious because the agency did not properly consider factors that the statute required the
agency to consider. Id. at 177-79.
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fined by Congress in the APA may facilitate greater uniformity in this area
of the law-an effect that the Supreme Court has identified as important. 3 12
A. Legal Determinations Beyond the Agency's Statutory Authority
There are four circumstances in which a court may hold that an agency
has exceeded its statutory authority. The most obvious situation is when the
agency's legal determination conflicts with the clear meaning or intent of a
statute. 13 If a court determines that Congress has clearly foreclosed the
agency's legal interpretation, the agency has plainly acted in excess of its
statutory authority. In this situation, it does not matter whether the agency
purported to be exercising lawmaking power delegated by Congress. A
court has determined that the statute clearly forecloses the agency's inter-
pretation. This determination is analogous to a step 1 decision.
An agency also acts in excess of its statutory authority when it has
purported to exercise lawmaking power that Congress has not delegated to
the agency.314 Under the Part III nomenclature, this legal error would be
identified in the first part of the step 2 analysis. 1 Such an action by the
agency exceeds its statutory authority because a court has concluded that
Congress did not give the agency the authority to make law, so that the
agency had to have erred in seeking to exercise this nonexistent power. In
this circumstance, the court must itself give meaning to the otherwise ambi-
guous statute, because the agency has no lawmaking power. The court in-
terprets the statute giving Skidmore deference to the agency's substantive
determination.3 6 This second part of the court's decision is reflected in step
3(B)(1) of Part III.
The third way in which an agency acts in excess of its statutory author-
ity is when the agency has not acted in the exercise of delegated lawmaking
power, and the agency is determined to have misinterpreted an otherwise
ambiguous statute. In this situation, the agency has not exercised the law-
making power that Congress had delegated to it. The court itself must in-
terpret the ambiguous statute, employing Skidmore deference so that the
312 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011)
("[W]e have expressly '[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial
review of administrative action."' (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))); see also Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1989)
(rejecting application of "a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Congress dele-
gates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power").
313 This type of decision is discussed supra Part Ill.A (step I analysis).
314 E.g., Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing that agency lacked delegated authority to promulgate video description regulations).
315 See supra Part IV.
316 Oregon v. Gonzales, discussed supra notes 166-69, 187-91, 212 and accompanying text, is an
example of this type of court review.
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agency can aid the court in determining how the statute should apply. This
decision is made at step 3(B)(1) of the integrated review process."'
The final way in which an agency acts in excess of statutory authority
is when the agency concludes that the statute itself clearly requires a partic-
ular legal rule, and a reviewing court concludes that the statute is ambi-
guous with regard to the legal issue. Various Supreme Court opinions sug-
gest that in this type of case a court ought to remand the matter to the agen-
cy if Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the agency. In the ab-
sence of an agency possessing lawmaking power, though, a court's deter-
mination of the ambiguous statute's meaning would be informed by the
agency's expertise and experience. In the latter situation, a court should
refrain from freezing the content of the law without the agency having an
initial opportunity to decide the matter based on its expertise and expe-
rience."' The legal ossification concern arises here because an agency
would not be able to supersede the court's interpretation of the ambiguous
statute, because (we have assumed) the agency lacks lawmaking authority.
One critical characteristic that is common to each of these four types
of agency actions beyond statutory authority is the congressional source of
the law being interpreted by the court. In this circumstance, the court is
playing its key function as interpreter of legislation."' An agency may help
in persuading the court about the statute's meaning, but Congress is the sole
source of the law.
B. Arbitrary or Capricious Agency Determinations
There are two circumstances in which an agency's legal conclusions
will be determined to have been arbitrary or capricious. The first circums-
tance occurs when an agency has acted in the exercise of delegated law-
making power in interpreting a statute that does not foreclose the agency
interpretation, but the agency's decisionmaking process was unlawful. This
circumstance is discussed in step 3(A) of Part III, and reflects a better un-
derstanding of step two of Chevron analysis.320
The second type of arbitrary or capricious decisionmaking occurs
when the agency's interpretation and application of an ambiguous statute is
found by a court to be substantively permissible (under step 3(B)(1) of Part
III), but was the result of an unlawful process. This is step 3(B)(2) of Part
III. This type of case is most likely to emerge when the party challenging
317 See supra Part 1IlD.
318 The agency interpretation would then be subject to later review with the agency determination
accorded Skidmore deference.
319 See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3, at 612 (describing "bounding agency authority" as "an
essential judicial function").
320 See supra Part Ill.C.
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the agency action concedes that the statute permits the substantive decision,
but challenges the decisionmaking process.3 21
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's seminal decision in Chevron had suggested sim-
plicity-a straightforward two-step process-in the standards for judicial
review of agency legal decisions. The case, however, did not deliver that
simplicity. Its approach to review, for example, failed to define clearly the
role of courts in reviewing the substance of an agency's legal determination
and obscured the relevance of arbitrary or capricious review. The review
scheme became far more complicated after the Court's decision in Mead,
which established that the older Skidmore review regime applied to the re-
view of many legal determinations.
This Article sought to untangle the different components of review of
agency legal determinations by focusing principally on the source of law
being reviewed by the court, as well as on the role being played by the court
in determining the applicable law. It also sought to define a clear step-by-
step process of review, as well as relating the review regime to the key re-
view standards defined by the APA.
The Article's most important conclusion is that, when an agency has
exercised delegated lawmaking power to interpret an ambiguous statute, a
reviewing court should review only the permissibility of the agency's deci-
sionmaking process, rather than the agency's substantive interpretation. If,
however, an agency has not exercised delegated lawmaking power to in-
terpret an ambiguous statute, the court must itself determine the statute's
substantive meaning, with the agency's views accounted for through Skid-
more deference. So-called Chevron deference, accordingly, has the effect of
removing the judiciary from making a substantive interpretation of an am-
biguous statute when the agency has engaged in lawmaking.
321 See supra Part IV.
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